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1 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. ____ (2006). 
Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigmsin the “War on Terrorism”: Applying the Core Rulesto the Release of Persons Deemed “Unprivileged Combatants”SEAN D. MURPHY*The purpose of this essay, written in late 2006, is to take stock of the current application ofthe Geneva Conventions in the global “war on terrorism,” including interpretations recently takenby the U.S. Supreme Court in the Hamdan case.1 As will be evident in the discussion that follows,the Geneva Conventions and the laws of war more generally comprise a sophisticated regulatoryregime whose rules can and should be closely analyzed by lawyers. Yet, like all law, the inevitableimprecision in the rules presents opportunities for governments to exploit gray areas so as toaugment governmental authority, and to avoid sensible interpretations that will protect individualsfrom overreaching governmental power. Such exploitation, however, invariably severs the rules fromtheir ethical foundation and loses sight of their underlying object and purpose. The events of 9/11 and their aftermath revealed complicated scenarios that do not fit easilyinto the traditional paradigms of the laws of war, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Highlyknowledgeable persons in the field have reached diametrically opposite conclusions about certainfundamental issues, such as whether the conflict with Al Qaeda constitutes an “armed conflict”within the meaning of the laws of war, whether it matters if the Taliban wore regular uniforms oroperated within a regular command structure, and whether a person who fails to qualify as a prisonerof war under one convention must invariably then qualify as a protected civilian under another. Manyof these controversies arise because the two dominant paradigms that operate within the GenevaConventions—one concerning “international” armed conflict between two or more states, and theother concerning “non-international” (typically understood as internal) armed conflict between astate and non-state actors—do not fit the phenomenon of global terrorism, where the dominantparadigm concerns transnational armed conflict between state and non-state actors.Yet from their earliest formation, the laws of war have recognized the problem of dealingwith irregular forces and the problem of adapting the law to circumstances that change over time.For that reason, built into the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols are the meansfor taking account of areas that are not addressed explicitly or in detail. Rather than trying to exploitsuch gray areas in the law, lawyers should seek to inject the dictates of humanity into them, in amanner that best reconciles the competing interests during armed conflict of both governments andpersons who are at risk.________________________*Professor of Law, George Washington University. The author wishes to thank John Crook, AshleyDeeks, Monica Hakimi, and Mike Matheson for very helpful comments on an earlier draft, andKevin Futch (‘08) for excellent research assistance. 
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Part I of this essay recounts some of the history concerning the formation of contemporarylaws of war, with a particular focus on the writings of Francis Lieber. This part sets forth how theproblem of the “guerrilla” (or  “brigand” or “outlaw”) is not unique to our post-9/11 era; it is aproblem that has bedeviled the law of war for quite some time. Lieber saw it as desirable to try todraw distinctions among different type of guerrillas, and to contemplate according varying levels ofprotection to them. Thereafter, the laws of war began evolving to try to take account of certain kindsof guerillas—civilians rising as part of a levee en masse, organized partisans operating incoordination with a belligerent, peoples fighting against colonial domination or racist regimes—byaccording to them protections despite not being members of a state’s regular armed forces. Even so,this evolution stopped short of seeking to accord to organizations engaged in terrorist activityprotections under the laws of war.Part II briefly recounts the two central paradigms that emerged in the post-Lieber era for ruleson protections of persons caught upon in armed conflict. Now reflected in the 1949 GenevaConventions and their additional protocols, the two paradigms speak to rules that apply to“international” (state-to-state) conflicts and rules that apply to “non-international” armed conflicts,with the latter traditionally understood to mean internal conflicts. Here, too, the laws of war evolvedin a manner that largely did not, at least expressly, address the phenomenon of a state-versus-non-state actor conflict that was transnational in scope.Part III recounts how these deficiencies played out in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of9/11. The central paradigms of the Geneva Conventions were strictly construed by the U.S.government, resulting in a classification of alleged Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees as “combatants”who could be detained until the “cessation of hostilities,” but as “unlawful” (or unprivileged)combatants who had no ability to take advantage of the protections normally accorded prisoners ofwar or civilian internees under the laws of war. Indeed, the central paradigms proved inadequate fordealing with the three different types of armed conflict emerged in the post-9/11 period. Even so, aset of fundamental humanitarian principles—principles that are widely regarded as the hallmark ofan advancing civilization—were recognized as relevant for regulating each of these conflicts. Article3 common to the four Geneva Conventions came to be seen as a set of basic default rules that shouldbe applied even in the unusual context of a conflict between a country and a global terroristmovement, Al Qaeda. Part IV explains why a parsimonious construction of the Geneva Conventions is neitherhelpful nor appropriate. Within the laws of war exist the means for accommodating the changedcircumstances that global terrorism presents. Indeed, the manner in which events unfolded after 9/11suggests that states moved ultimately to a position of applying fundamental principles ofinternational humanitarian law to the unusual circumstances that unfolded.As an example of how one might allow the Geneva Conventions to evolve in a sensiblefashion, Part VI discusses the rules that should be applied with respect to the termination of the
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2 See EDWARD KOSSOY, LIVING WITH GUERRILLA 47-58 (1976).
3 The instructions were part of the U.S. War Department’s General Orders No. 100, whichis reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45 (1983)
4 Even less known is that Lieber had sons who fought on both sides of the American CivilWar (one of whom died), id. at 6-7, which no doubt animated his interest in promoting humanityin warfare.
5 See HENRY W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR RULES REGARDING THEINTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE OR WAR (1861).3
captivity of unprivileged combatants, such as those held at Guantánamo Bay. While the environmentfor handling such detainees remains fluid, and the norms expressed by the laws of war on thesepoints are far from certain, this essay suggests answers that are legally plausible and that appearconsistent with sound policy choices. Similar efforts to fill in the gray areas for other aspects of thelaw of war as it relates to global terrorism should also be pursued.I.  Of Guerillas and Brigands: The Ghost of Francis LieberThe problem of the unprivileged or irregular combatant in a time of armed conflict is not newto the law of war.2 From the start, efforts to codify the laws of war have grappled with whether andhow to accommodate the phenomenon of persons fighting outside regular military units. Byrecounting some of the early history of these codification efforts, this part seeks to demonstrate thatthis is an old problem, and that the laws of war have emerged cognizant of its existence. Contemporary laws of war often are traced back to the writings of Francis Lieber during thecourse of the American Civil War. Lieber is best known as the author of one of the first codificationsof the law of land warfare—the 1863 Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the UnitedStates in the Field3—which thereafter influenced the development of national manuals on warfareby many countries, and helped pave the way for the 1899 and 1907 Hague conventions on the lawsof war. Less known is his work on the problem of “guerrillas” during wartime.4 After the outbreakof the Civil War, the Union Army found itself confronted not just by the Confederate Armiesoperating largely as armies do (under a centralized command, with regular and open movements,etc.), but by a wide range irregular forces that were loosely referred to as guerillas. General HenryHalleck, the General-in-Chief of the Union Armies, and also an acclaimed expert in the field ofinternational law,5 asked Lieber for his views on how to treat such guerillas: were they to be treatedsimply as criminals or as something else?His essay responding to Halleck, entitled Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the
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6 Francis Lieber, Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages ofWar (1861), reprinted in, HARTIGAN, supra note 3, at 31.
7 Id. at 31.




Laws and Usages of War,6 helped clarify that there were differing types of guerillas who wereentitled to differing levels of protection. After noting the origins of the term “guerilla” (thediminutive of the Spanish word guerra, thus meaning “petty war”),7 Lieber stated: “It is universallyunderstood in this country at the present time that a guerrilla party means an irregular band of armedmen, carrying on an irregular war, not being able, according to their character as a guerilla party, tocarry on what the law terms a regular war.”8 That understanding speaks volumes to us today as weconsider the threat of a terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda, which cannot operate in the mannerof a regular army, and yet can carry on acts that in their violence and intensity can approximate thatof a military attack.For Lieber, this broad understanding of “guerillas” was not good enough; one needed to digdeeper and to be more discriminating. He considered multiple types of ideas that could be associatedwith different types of guerillas. One idea of the guerrilla is simply an irregular force that is self-constituted and not a part of the normal process of conscription or volunteering for the regular army.Such a guerrilla force might be fighting for the same cause as an army, and might operate in closecoordination with the army, but is not associated with the system of army “pay, provision ormovements.”9 Since the guerilla force is not self-sustaining, Lieber noted that a further idea of theguerilla concerned pillaging of the countryside, an act that imposed hardships on the civilianpopulation, but that to a certain extent is an understandable necessity for such a force. Yet Lieber identified far more pernicious ideas of the guerilla that might arise. For example,a guerilla group might be motivated by an “idea of intentional destruction for the sake of destruction,because the guerrilla chief cannot aim at any strategic advantages or regular fruits of victory.”10Similarly pernicious is the idea of guerillas engaging in “necessitated murder, because guerrillabands cannot encumber themselves with prisoners of war; they have, therefore, frequently, perhapsgenerally, killed their prisoners, thus introducing a system of barbarity which becomes intenser inits demoralization as it spreads and is prolonged.”11 Indeed, since the organization of the guerillas“being but slight and the leader utterly dependent upon the band, little discipline can be enforced,and where no discipline is enforced in war a state of things results which resembles far more the wars
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12 Id. at 33-34.
13 Id. at 34.
14 Id. at 35.
15 Id. at 36.
16 Id. at 38-39.
17 Id. at 41.
18 Id. at 35, 42. 5
recorded in Froissart, or Comines, or the thirty-years’ war, and the religious war in France, than theregular wars of modern times . . . .”12These more pernicious ideas resonate with the contemporarysense of the terrorist threat and with some of the sentiments felt by those responding to that threat.Hence, Lieber thought it useful to classify various types of persons who fall within thegeneral rubric of “guerrilla,” to wit: “The freebooter, the marauder, the brigand, the partisan, the freecorps, the spy, the rebel, the conspirator, the robber, and especially the highway robber, the risingen masse, or the ‘arming of the peasants.’”13 Some of these types of persons might be allied closelywith a regular army; Lieber viewed “partisans” as a corps operating separate from a main army, butthat is nevertheless “part and parcel of the army.”14 Such persons are not inherently lawless and maybe entitled to the benefits of war.15 Other types of persons may not be allied with a regular army, butare still entitled to protection, such as the rising en masse of peasants to resist an invasion.16 Yetthere are those who fall outside any protection. Lieber wrote:It is different if we understand by guerrilla parties, self-constituted sets of armed menin times of war, who form no integrant part of the organized army, do not stand on theregular pay-roll of the army, or are not paid at all, take up arms and lay them down atintervals, and carry on petty war (guerrilla) chiefly by raids, extortion, destruction, andmassacre, and who cannot encumber themselves with many prisoners, and who will thereforegenerally give no quarter.They are peculiarly dangerous because they easily evade pursuit, and by laying downtheir arms become insidious enemies; because they cannot otherwise subsist than by rapine,and almost always degenerate into simply robbers or brigands. . . .17While such persons might be granted certain protections if captured in the midst of a “fair fight andopen warfare,” as a general matter such persons are to be treated as “brigands, who are “subject tothe infliction of death if captured.”18 Lieber concludes his essay with the admonition that “no army,
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19 Id. at 44.
20 HARTIGAN, supra note 3, at 11.
21 See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 737-38(1988).
22 Id. at 784-86.
23 Id. at 784. 6
no society engaged in war, any more than a society at peace, can allow unpunished assassination,robbery, and devastation without the deepest injury to itself and disastrous consequences with mightchange the very issue of war.”19 Thus, while Lieber is credited with helping launch the formation of our contemporaryinternational humanitarian law, he regarded a certain category of brigands as being fully outside thescope of that law, and viewed such persons as a unique threat to society that could not be tolerated.Though Lieber did not identify specific persons or groups during the Civil War that would fall intodiffering categories of guerrillas, one can imagine what he had in mind.20  For example, one of themain guerrilla groups operating outside the Confederate command system, comprising in total some800 men, was under the command of John Singleton Mosby in Western Virginia. Small squads of“Mosby’s Rangers” would attack Union outposts and wagon trains with such vigor that the areabecame know as “Mosby’s Confederacy.”21 One imagines that these forces, preying solely upon theUnion military, were viewed by Lieber as a somewhat more acceptable form ofguerilla—Confederate partisans who shared the objectives and targets of an established belligerent.By contrast, a very different form of guerilla was epitomized by William Clarke Quantrill, whoseraiders in Kansas and Missouri simply slaughtered unarmed soldiers and civilians, including aninfamous massacre at Lawrence, Kansas in 1863.22 As James McPherson has put it, “[t]he guerrillafighting in Missouri produced a form of terrorism that exceeded anything else in the war. JayhawkingKansans and bushwhacking Missourians took no prisoners, killed in cold blood, plundered andpillaged and burned (but almost never raped) without stint.”23 Lieber no doubt viewed such raidersas the “peculiarly dangerous” brigands that society simply cannot tolerate and that the laws of wardid not protect. The contemporary terrorist threat by a group such as Al Qaeda is largely viewed in the UnitedStates as comparable to Lieber’s guerilla brigands. The terrorist may have some generalized strategicobjective, but he operates in a free-wheeling manner unmoored from the constraints of being asovereign entity, and engages in attacks that fail to discriminate between military and non-militarytargets. To the extent that the United States regards Al Qaeda as contemporary brigands who arequalitatively different from those the law of war was intended to protect, it appears that Lieber’s
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24 See Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, arts. 1-2[hereinafter Hague Regulations], annexed to Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 187 Consol. T.S. 227; KOSSOY, supra note 2, 73-105.
25 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War , Aug. 12, 1949,art. 4A(2), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Geneva Convention III); KOSSOY, supra note 2, 106-112; see generally Theodore Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of GuerrillaWarfare, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 173 (1971). 7
ghost is still with us.Lieber was concerned, of course, with the “guerilla”  principally as a feature of a civil war,not as a stand-alone phenomenon, and that has been the case as well since his time. The normalguerilla model is one of indigenous bands fighting against a colonial oppressor (e.g., Frenchpartisans fighting the German Army in occupied France during World War II or the Algerian Frontde Libération Nationale fighting the French Army in Algeria in 1954-62), or fighting against anindigenous government (e.g., Fidel Castro’s rise to power in Cuba in 1956-59). Though operatingwith many of the same tactics and objectives as guerillas of the past, a terrorist group such as AlQaeda is far more transnational in nature, and operates without any connection to a sustainedcontestation with a standing army.Since Lieber’s time, the laws of war have evolved in ways that accommodate some aspectsof the phenomenon of the guerrilla. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences accordedcombatant status to “militia” and “volunteer corps” who fulfilled certain conditions, and to personsengaged in a levée en masse, whereby civilians spontaneously take up arms to resist an invadingforce in unoccupied territory.24 The latter persons, though civilians, can become protected POWs solong as they carry their arms openly and obey the laws and customs of war. After World War II,combatant status was further expanded to include “organized resistance movements,”25 such as theFrench forces who fought within France during the Nazi occupation. With the advent of globalterrorist movements, such as Al Qaeda, it has become necessary to consider whether and how thelaws of war apply to such movements. On the hand, persons associated with Al Qaeda may be seenas modern outlaws or brigands, entitled to no protection as “unprivileged” combatants. On the otherhand, the magnitude of the threat posed by such a movement has prompted the United States to viewits response as a “war on terrorism,” to invoke legal doctrines associated with wartime action, andto deploy vast military forces to combat the threat. The next section discusses how the centralparadigms that exist under contemporary laws of war do not easily address the phenomenon of globalterrorism.II.  The Central Paradigms in the 1949 Geneva Conventions
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26 Geneva Convention Relative to the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded andSick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (GenevaConvention I); Geneva Convention Relative to the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75U.N.T.S. 85 (Geneva Convention II); Geneva Convention III, supra note 25; Geneva ConventionRelative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3526, 75U.N.T.S. 287 (Geneva Convention IV). As of 2006, 194 states have adhered to the 1949 GenevaConventions.
27 Partial Award on Prisoners of War, Ethiopia’s Claim No. 4, para. 45 (July 1, 2003),reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 1056, 1064 (2003).
28 The Claims Commission was established  under the Peace Agreement, Eri.-Eth., Dec.12, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 260, with a mandate of determining whether violations of international lawoccurred during the course of the conflict. The Commission consists of five arbitrators: Hans van8
The 1949 Geneva Conventions26 are principally concerned with international armedconflicts, by which is meant armed conflicts that arise between two or more states. While it does notmatter whether either of the states formally recognize the existence of a “war,” nor whether theyrecognize the legitimacy of each other, the Conventions’ several hundred articles are built aroundthe paradigm of two opposing states, operating normally through the use of their regular armies,though perhaps assisted by militias or volunteer corps. Thus, Geneva Convention III on the treatmentof prisoners of war (POW) anticipates that the well-functioning government of each belligerent willbe in a position to detain prisoners at organized camps, where a variety of rights can be accorded tothe prisoners and where a protecting power may monitor the prisoner’s well-being. A modernapplication of Geneva Convention III may be seen in Ethiopia’s treatment of Eritrean prisonersduring the 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrean war. Though Ethiopia viewed Eritrea as having initiatedthe war by its May 1998 invasion, nevertheless Ethiopia, as a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,operated its prison camps largely in accordance with Geneva Convention III, and allowed access bythe International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) throughout the conflict.27 This paradigm of two opposing states engaged in an inter-state armed conflict is also apparentwith respect to the protections accorded to civilians. Geneva Convention IV largely contemplatestwo particular categories of civilians who need protection in the course of a conventional armedconflict between two states: (1) civilians of one belligerent who happen to be in the otherbelligerent’s territory, such as might occur at the outbreak of the armed conflict; and(2) civilians whoare in their own country but fall under the occupation of the enemy belligerent. Thus, the Conventionis closely tied into the notion of geography; it assumes that both of the belligerents will be exercisingsovereign control over territory and thus will have obligations with respect to enemy aliens locatedwithin that territory. Here, too, the recent Ethiopia-Eritrea war demonstrates the paradigm. TheEritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission28 has determined that, under Geneva Convention IV, Eritrea
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Houtte (president); George Aldrich; John Crook; James Paul; and Lucy Reed. In the context of a discussion about “asymmetric warfare,” it is interesting to note thatEritrea only acceded to the 1949 Geneva Conventions in August 2000 and thus was not—as amatter of treaty law—bound to them for most of the armed conflict. Nevertheless, Ethiopiadetermined that it would act in accordance with the Conventions in its treatment of victims of theconflict, and called upon Eritrea to do the same. After the conflict was over, the ClaimsCommission found that contemporary customary international humanitarian law was“exemplified by the relevant parts of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.” The Commissionnoted: (1) the widespread acceptance by states of the conventions over the course of their fifty-year existence; (2) that law of war treaties “build upon the foundation laid by earlier treaties andby customary international law”; and (3) that “rules that commend themselves to the internationalcommunity in general . . . can more quickly become part of customary international law thanother types of rules found in treaties.” Partial Award on Prisoners of War,  supra note 27, atparas. 30-31. Consequently, the Commission found that Ethiopia and Eritrea were boundthroughout their conflict to rules of customary international law as reflected in the 1949 GenevaConventions.
29 See Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Awards on Civilian Claims (Dec. 17,2004), 44 I.L.M. 601 (Eritrea’s Claims) & 630 (Ethiopia’s Claims) (2005).
30 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, art. 39
was bound to various obligations as an occupying power in Ethiopia over the course of two years,and further had obligations with respect to Ethiopians that found themselves in Eritrea at theoutbreak of the war. Ethiopia had the same obligations with respect to its brief occupation of Eritreanterritory in 2000 and with respect to Eritreans who were in Ethiopia at the outbreak of the war.29The 1949 Geneva Conventions do contemplate an alternative paradigm, in the form of  armedconflict that is not international in nature. Article 3 common to all four conventions (common Article3) briefly sets forth certain minimum standards that are to be applied “[i]n the case of armed conflictnot of an international character  occurring in the territory  of one of the High Contracting Parties. . . .”30 Those standards provide that persons no longer taking active part in such hostilities “shallin all circumstances be treated humanely” and, to that end, certain acts against them are prohibited:(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, crueltreatment and torture;(b) taking of hostages;(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
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31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 169 (1994) (“The Red Crossmovement . . . , as after the war it focused on the question of revising and improving the GenevaConventions, had their extension to civil wars in the centre of its sights.”); Richard R. Baxter, Iusin Bello Interno: The Present and Future Law, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD518, 519 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) (“The Conference ultimately came around to the viewthat the most that states could be expected to accept would be a short statement of the basichumanitarian principles that should be given effect in civil conflicts. The result was Article 3. . . .”); Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 39 (2003); see alsoU.S. Dep’t of the Army Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare, FM 27-10 at 9 (1956) (quotingcommon Article 3 in discussing the law applicable to “civil war”); U.K. Ministry of Defence,The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 384-86 (2004) (discussing common Article 3 asapplying to “internal armed conflict”). The same thinking carried over to the initial negotiationsof the additional protocols. See MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH, & WALDEMAR A. SOLF,NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLSADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 at 39 (1982) [hereinafter NEWRULES].(“The pre-conference work . . . was based on the following concept: The distinctionbetween international and national conflicts, which is made on the factual and objective basis ofwhether a conflict takes place in the territory of different states or inside one particular state . . .should be maintained”). 10
(d) the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without previous judgmentpronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guaranteeswhich are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.31Further, the parties to such a conflict should “endeavor to bring into force, by means of specialagreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.”32A fair reading of the negotiating history suggests that this “common Article 3" paradigm wasprincipally designed to address the situation of an armed conflict internal to a single state.33 One ofthe parties to that armed conflict would normally be the government of the state; the other partywould be a major insurgent group seeking to obtain control of the country. Thus, common Article3 contemplates an armed conflict between a state and non-state actor, but does so largely in thecontext of the classic civil war. For such a conflict, the Geneva Conventions do not accord any“prisoner of war” or “protected civilian” status to detainees. Moreover, detainees may be prosecutedunder the criminal laws of the state for having engaged in violent acts; there is no privileging of theirconduct under the laws of war. Yet certain minimum standards of Article 3 do apply: persons whoare no longer taking an active part in the hostilities must be treated humanely, and cannot be exposed
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34 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to theProtection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609(Protocol I).
35 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to theProtection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609(Protocol II). In December 2005, a third additional protocol was adopted to create an additionalemblem alongside the red cross and red crescent, known as the red crystal. See ProtocolAdditional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to Adoption of anAdditional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, ____ I.L.M. ____ (Protocol III). 
36 Supra note 24.
37 See http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470?OpenDocument. 
38 Protocol II, supra note 35, art. I.
39 Id. 11
to violence or outrages upon personal dignity, nor the passing of sentence or execution without ajudgment pronounced by a regularly-constituted court. The paradigms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions were largely followed and extended withtwo 1977 protocols, generally referred to as “Protocol I”34 and “Protocol II.”35 Protocol I focuses oncodifying and developing the law relating to the first paradigm—international armed conflict—byclarifying and advancing the law both on protection of victims and on means/methods of war. Withrespect to the protection of victims, Protocol I revisits, clarifies, and expands upon the variousprotections addressed in the earlier 1907 Hague Regulations36 and 1949 Geneva Conventions. Inparticular, as discussed further below, Article 75 lays down a series of fundamental protections towhich all persons “in the power of a Party to the conflict” are entitled without discrimination. As of2006, 166 states have adhered to Protocol I, not including the United States.37Protocol II focuses on the law relating to the second paradigm, stating that it “develops andsupplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions . . . .”38 In so doing, Protocol II expresslystates that it covers conflicts “which take place between its armed forces and dissident armed forcesor other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over apart of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and toimplement this Protocol.”39 Such language confirms the general understanding that common Article3 is focused on internal armed conflicts or civil wars. Protocol II then lays down a series offundamental protections to which all persons involved in internal conflicts are entitled without
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40 Id., art. 4.
41 See http://www.icrc.org.
42 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 1(4).
43 Id., art. 44(3)
44 Id., art. 44(4).
45 See NEW RULES, supra note 33, at 255.
46 See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 321 (2d ed.2000).  By contrast, Protocol II requires that the non-state actor control part of the nationalterritory, making its application to guerrillas problematic. According to Green:If the dissident forces are constantly on the move and lack any fixed location from whichto exercise control the Protocol [II] will not operate. Guerrilla or partisan activitiesagainst the administration, however effective, would therefore not be protected by theProtocol, though they would be covered by common Article 3.Id. 12
discrimination.40 As of 2006, 160 states had adhered to the protocol, not including the UnitedStates.41The problem of the “guerilla” was partially addressed as a part of Protocol I to the 1949Geneva Conventions. Article 1(4) of Protocol I extended “international armed conflict” to coverarmed conflicts involving peoples “fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation andagainst racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination . . . .”42 Thus, just as Liebergrappled with making distinctions among different kinds of guerillas, a particular type of modern-dayguerrilla—the non-state actor fighting against a colonial or racist regime—is allowed to enter intothe full realm of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (not just the realm of common Article 3). Suchguerillas are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that approximates the conduct expectedof a regular army; thus they can receive POW status if captured so long as they take certain limitedsteps to distinguish themselves from the civilian population at the time of their attacks.43 (They maydress in civilian clothing and carry their arms secretly, but must carry the arms openly just before andduring their attack.) If they fail to so conduct themselves, they are still granted protections“equivalent in all respects to those accorded” to POWs under Geneva Convention III and ProtocolI,44 including judicial safeguards, but the conduct constitutes a violation of international law forwhich the guerilla may be prosecuted.45 There is no requirement that the non-state actor control aportion of territory, and therefore may operate entirely from bases located in adjacent countries.46
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48 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 96(3). 13
The United States opposed this expansive approach of Protocol I, claiming that it accords fartoo much protection and legitimacy to non-state groups, potentially including terroristorganizations.47 Moreover, characterizing the Taliban or Al Qaeda as engaged in conflict with theUnited States as a fight “against colonial domination and alien occupation” or against a “racist”regime, is a stretch; for all its missteps, the United States never colonized Afghanistan, nor engagedin racist oppression of the kind seen in South Africa or Rhodesia. Further, Al Qaeda has never madethe necessary unilateral declaration seeking status, and assuming rights and obligations, underProtocol I.48 In short, while Protocol I may be seen as extending the full panoply of law of warprotections to certain contemporary guerillas, it does not do so with respect to the entire range ofnon-state actors. In any event, this expansion of the traditional laws of war in Protocol I has beenrejected by the United States, and is one of the principal reasons the United States has not ratifiedthe protocol.Hence, as originally designed, the 1949 Geneva Conventions left something of a gray area.Conflicts between two states were regulated, and conflicts between a state and an insurgency wereregulated, but (with one exception in Protocol I discussed above) nothing specifically addressed atransnational conflict between a state and a non-state actor. In the aftermath of 9/11, the BushAdministration sought to exploit that gray area as one means for denying to Al Qaeda detainees anyof the protections accorded under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including common Article 3. Onthe one hand, the Bush Administration argued that there was no inter-state conflict between theUnited States and Al Qaeda, since Al Qaeda was not a state; on the other hand, members of AlQaeda fell outside common Article 3, since it was not an insurgency against the U.S. governmentwithin U.S. territory. Views have differed over whether the Administration’s position with respect to Al Qaeda wascorrect, but few would disagree that the intervention in Afghanistan introduced an array of problemsin applying the Geneva Convention paradigms, and exposed the paradigms’ weaknesses and limits.The circumstances that unfolded in Afghanistan ultimately may prove to be sui generis, but theability of terrorist groups to thrive in countries where there is a poorly functioning government (atpresent, countries such as Somalia and Sudan come to mind) suggests that history in this context maywell repeat itself. The next section briefly recounts that history.III.  The Paradigms Applied Post-9/11
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The post-9/11 events, especially but not exclusively as they relate to Al Qaeda, did not fitneatly into 1949 Geneva Conventions’ paradigms. Most observers would likely accept that therewere three types of conflicts that came into play: (1) an internal armed conflict between the NorthernAlliance and the Taliban, a conflict that predated 9/11; (2) an international armed conflict betweena U.S.-led coalition of states and Afghanistan; and (3) a particularly-hard-to-analyze conflict betweenthe United States and a non-state organization, Al Qaeda. By considering each of these conflicts inturn, it becomes apparent why many roads in contemporary armed conflict can lead to applicationof the minimum standards of common Article 3, rather than the full range of protections containedin the 1949 Geneva Conventions as a whole. De Jure Afghan Government/Northern Alliance v. De Facto Afghan Government (Taliban).The post-9/11 period saw an armed conflict between members of the Northern Alliance and theTaliban, but that conflict predated 9/11. Two principal actors were engaged in that armed conflict:a de jure government of Afghanistan that politically headed military forces in the form of theNorthern Alliance; and a de facto government of Afghanistan in the form of the Taliban.Burhanuddin Rabbani headed the government of Afghanistan at the time of the rise of theTaliban . Rabbani had previously served as a leader of the mujahideen in their fight against Sovietrule in Afghanistan. Rabbani’s forces were the first mujahideen group to enter Kabul in 1992 whenthe puppet communist government was overthrown. Rabbani then served as President of Afghanistanfrom 1992 to1996 until he was forced to leave Kabul because of the Taliban takeover of the city. Asdiscussed in somewhat more detail below, the Taliban originally was a religious movement that in1994 began military operations to seize control of Afghanistan.49 From 1994 to 2001, the Talibanwas in relatively constant armed conflict with the existing Afghan warlords and their militias, whoultimately banded together in 1996-97 to form the Afghan Northern Alliance, formally known as the“United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan.” By 2001, the Taliban had gained controlof ninety percent of the territory of Afghanistan. Thus, as of 9/11, the de facto government ofAfghanistan was the Taliban.Though ousted from control of Afghanistan, Rabbani maintained that he was the head of theAfghan government and continued to control most of Afghanistan’s embassies abroad. Further, hisrepresentatives retained Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations. Meanwhile, the U.N. GeneralAssembly repeatedly deferred consideration of the Taliban representative’s credentials. Rabbani wasregarded as the political head of the Northern Alliance and his military commander, Ahmed ShahMassoud (and later Mohammed Fahim after Massoud's assassination), maintained control of the tenpercent of Afghanistan (in the northeast) not under Taliban control. It was Rabbani who formallyhanded over power to an interim government headed by Hamid Karzai on December 22, 2001.
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50 S.C. Res. 1076, pmbl. & paras. 3-5 (Oct. 22, 1996).
51 S.C. Res. 1193, pmbl. (Aug. 28, 1998).
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53 Id., para. 12.
54 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, arts. 146-147.15
One might regard this Northern Alliance-Taliban conflict as fitting the paradigm of a non-international armed conflict, since it has the characteristics of an internal armed conflict (or civilwar). If so, then common Article 3 would set forth the governing norms from the 1949 GenevaConventions, since Afghanistan ratified the conventions in 1956. Since Afghanistan has not yetratified Protocol II, both sides in this conflict would be obligated to adhere to the minimum standardsset forth in common Article 3, but not the more detailed standards of the remainder of the GenevaConventions nor of Protocol II.Afghan politics, however, are anything but simple. Even in 1996 the Security Council wascalling upon foreign countries to stop sending arms, ammunition, and personnel in support of theAfghan parties, and declaring that continuation of the conflict provided “fertile ground for terrorismand drug trafficking which destabilize the region and beyond . . . .”50 The perception that the conflicthad international dimensions was reinforced in 1998 when the Security Council directly addressedthe application of the laws of war to Afghanistan. Expressing concern that the conflict was “causinga serious and growing threat to regional and international peace and security”51 and that there hadbeen “foreign interference in Afghanistan, including the involvement of foreign military personneland the supply of arms and ammunition to all parties in the conflict,”52 the Security Councilexpressly and unanimously reaffirmedthat all parties to the conflict are bound to comply with their obligations under internationalhumanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and thatpersons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions areindividually responsible in respect of such breaches.53The reference to “grave breaches” of the Convention appears to signal a belief by themembers of the Security Council that the entirety of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (not just commonArticle 3) applied to the Afghan civil war, since the grave breaches provisions relate to variousobligations under the conventions other than common Article 3, such as unlawful deportation ortransfer.54 This has prompted some scholars, such as Adam Roberts, to refer to the Afghanconflict—even prior to the events of 2001—as an “internationalized civil war” or “internationalized
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55 Adam Roberts, The Laws of War in the War on Terror, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ANDTHE WAR ON TERROR 175, 193 (Fred L. Borch & Paul S. Wilson eds., 2003) (U.S. Naval WarCollege Int’l Law Studies Vol. 79).
56 See Baxter, supra note 33, at 523-24; Hans-Peter Gasser, Internationalized Non-International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Lebanon, 33 AM.U. L. REV. 145 (1983); HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS AND CIVIL WARS 63-65 (1995); see also THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVILWAR (Richard A. Falk ed., 1971).
57 See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 220 (2d ed. 2004).
58 Id. at 219.
59 Roberts, supra note 55, at 193. 16
non-international armed conflict.”55 Similar phenomena of largely civil wars that attract foreigninvolvement may be seen in prior conflicts in Vietnam, Cambodia and Lebanon,56 and also insituations where a unitary state in the midst of civil war fragments into several new states, asoccurred in the former Yugoslavia.57 In such cases, one might take the position that “the whole ofthe law of armed conflict would apply,”58 or might more cautiously maintain that “the rulespertaining to both international and civil wars may be applicable in different aspects and phases ofthe conflict.”59 After the intervention in the Afghan conflict by the U.S.-led coalition in October 2001,whereby coalition forces joined the Northern Alliance in largely ousting the Taliban from theircontrol of Afghanistan,  it seems plausible to maintain that, whatever might have been the situationbefore, the Afghan conflict either:• had been transformed into an international armed conflict, thus binding all parties(foreign and Afghan) to the full panoply of obligations of the Geneva Conventions;or • now consisted of two armed conflicts, one that was internal between the NorthernAlliance and the Taliban (governed by common Article 3), and another that wasinternational between the Coalition and the Taliban (governed by the full GenevaConventions).The first scenario is not very compelling, in that no matter what facts may develop on theground, the 1949 Geneva Conventions were not designed to impose obligations on non-state actors(other than those contained in common Article 3). Further confusion arises, however, in determining
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61 See Ann Scott Tyson, Taliban’s Gains Forestall U.S. Troop Reductions in Afghanistan,WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2006, at A13.
62 Geneva Convention III, art. 4(A)(3). Commentary on this issue tends to focus onGeneva Convention III Article 4(A)(1), which says that members of the “armed forces” of aparty, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming a part of such armed forces, areto be treated as POWs, without any reference to these four criteria. This provision is thencontrasted with Article 4(A)(2), which says that members of other militias or volunteers corps(i.e., those not forming part of the regular armed forces) must meet the criteria in order to qualifyas POWs. The relevant provision for the Taliban armed forces, however, is Article 4(A)(3), since17
whether either scenario continued after the Taliban had been severely decimated and driven to thesouthern part of the country, and particularly after the Afghan Interim Authority assumed power inDecember 2001, followed in June 2002 by creation of the Afghan Transitional Government.According to the ICRC, after June 2002 there was no longer any international armed conflict inAfghanistan, only an internal armed conflict.60 That conclusion may seem odd given that, as of late2006, there remain about 20,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan engaged in active fighting against theTaliban.61 Yet the theory is that, by June 2002, there were two states—the United States (and itsallies of course) and Afghanistan—that were no longer engaged in an armed conflict with each other.The conflict was between the new, internationally-recognized and -supported Afghan governmentand a largely indigenous insurgent group, the Taliban. As such, the conflict was non-internationalin nature and was principally governed by common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.U.S.-Led Coalition of States v. Afghanistan. In light of the above, it seems clear that therewas an international armed conflict between the states of the U.S.-led coalition and Afghanistanwhich commenced on October 7 with the coalition bombing campaign against targets in Afghanistan.All four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions came into play at that time with respect to actions betweenthe belligerents.  That campaign was directed against both the de facto government of the Talibanand against the terrorist organization Al Qaeda, but this particular conflict is best analyzed as onlyencompassing those members of Al Qaeda who were integrated into Taliban fighting units, and whofought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan.The United States took the view that members of the armed forces of the de facto governmentof Afghanistan, the Taliban, would not be accorded POW status under Geneva Convention III. Atthe time of the outbreak of the conflict, the Taliban was not recognized by the United States (or bythe vast majority of countries) as the lawful government of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this alone wasnot a basis for denying the Taliban POW status, since Article 4(A)(3) of Geneva Convention IIIrequires the detaining power to regard as POWs persons who are “[m]embers of regular armed forceswho profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.”62
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63 See Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to White HouseCounsel Alberto Gonzales (Feb. 7, 2002); White House Fact Sheet on Status of Detainees atGuantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002); see also Katherine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules FitTaliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A15; John Mintz & Mike Allen, Bush ShiftsPosition on Detainees, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at A1. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated:[T]he Taliban . . . did not wear uniforms, they did not have insignia, they did not carryweapons openly, and they were tied tightly to the waist to al Qaeda. They behaved likethem, they worked like them, they cooperated with respect to communications, theycooperated with respect to supplies and ammunition, and there isn’t any question in mymind . . . but that they are not—they would not rise to the standard of—a prisoner of war.U.S. Dep’t of Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability en route toCamp X-Ray (Jan. 27, 2002); see also Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for WarCrimes Issues, Status and Treatment of Taliban and al-Aqida Detainees, Remarks at ChathamHouse, London, United Kingdom (Feb. 20, 2002).
64 See, e.g., United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 558 (E.D. Va. 2002); Hamdan v.Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 548 U.S. ____ (2006). 
65 Compare George Aldrich, The Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Determination of IllegalCombatants, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 891(2002) (finding that the four criteria do not apply to membersof the armed forces of a party), with  Yoram Dinstein, Unlawful Combatancy, in INTERNATIONALLAW AND THE WAR ON TERROR, supra note 55, at 151 (finding that the criteria express a generalstandard for lawful combatancy and, while there may be a presumption that regular armed forces18
According to the United States, Article 4(A)(3) implicitly requires that members of “regulararmed forces” of a party meet four criteria found in Article 4(A)(2): they must operate within acommand structure, dress in a manner whereby they are recognizable at a distance as being militaryforces, carry arms openly, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws of war. Althoughthe Taliban could have qualified for POW status under Article 4(A)(3), the U.S. Government decidedthat they failed to do so because they did not operate in a command structure whereby militarycommanders took responsibility for subordinates, did not wear distinctive uniforms or otherinsignias, and did not act in accordance with the laws of war.63 U.S. courts, to the extent they havereached this issue, have concurred.64Knowledgeable law-of-war experts have divided over whether the Taliban were requiredmeet these criteria.65 There are at least three issues operating here. The first issue is whether there
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meet the criteria, the presumption may be rebutted).
66 As Bothe, Partsch, & Solf observed:It is generally assumed that these conditions were deemed, by the 1874 BrusselsConference and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences, to be inherent in theregular armed forces of States. Accordingly, it was considered to be unnecessary andredundant to spell them out in the Conventions. It seems to be clear that regular armedforces are inherently organized, that they are commanded by a person responsible for hissubordinates and that they are obliged under international law to conduct their operationsin accordance with the laws and customs of war.NEW RULES, supra note 33, at 234. Since the Geneva Conventions obligate a party to train itsmilitary authorities regarding their obligations under the Conventions, it is reasonable to expectthe armed forces to conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, art. 127. 19
are criteria that the detaining country may apply in determining whether certain persons should beregarded as “[m]embers of the regular armed forces” of a non-recognized belligerent. While it isclear that Geneva Convention III Article 4(A)(3) does not expressly apply the four criteria to “regulararmed forces,” the real question is what is meant by that phrase. Presumably it is not enough that agovernment merely declare that certain persons are a part of its regular armed forces. If that were thecase, then any government could designate any persons—whether militias, mercenaries, volunteers,guerillas, brigands or pirates—that are willing to attack its enemy as part of its “regular armedforces,” thereby extending to them a status that the laws of war clearly do not contemplate. Thebetter view is that it is implicit in the idea of establishing “regular armed forces” that the governmentmust be responsible for organizing, training, and using its recruits so that they can operate in themanner anticipated under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other laws of war.66 Seen in that light,the four criteria are simply a surrogate for determining whether a particular group of persons fallwithin the meaning of “[m]embers of the regular armed forces of a Party.” Thus, a government thatdoes not exercise command and control over the group of persons cannot expect other states partiesto view those persons as part of the government’s “regular armed forces.” Similarly, a governmentthat organizes the group of persons in a manner that prevents operation of a cardinal principle of thelaws of war—the obligation to distinguish combatants from non-combatants—and that fails toinculcate in them awareness of and fidelity to the laws of war, cannot expect other states parties toview those persons as part of the government’s “regular armed forces.” The official ICRCcommentary supports that position, asserting that the “regular armed forces” referred to in Article4(A)(3)have all the material characteristics and all the attributes of armed forces in the sense ofsubparagraph (1): they wear uniform, they have an organized hierarchy and they know and
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67 See 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 63 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) (hereinafter PICTETCOMMENTARY).
68 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to White House CounselAlberto R. Gonzales (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABUGHRAIB 136 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
69 See generally AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISMIN CENTRAL ASIA (2001); MARSDEN, supra note 49.
70 RASHID, supra note 69, at 33. 20
respect the laws and customs of war. The delegates to the 1949 Diplomatic Conference weretherefore fully justified in considering that there was no need to specify for such armed forcesthe requirements stated in sub-paragraph 2(a), (b), (c) and (d).67The second issue is whether, factually, Taliban personnel were operating as the “regulararmed forces” of Afghanistan. Here, neither the U.S. government nor most legal commentatorsparsing the Geneva Conventions have not done much to advance our understanding the nature of theTaliban as a military force. One of the more detailed U.S. government analyses that is publiclyavailable is a February 2002 memorandum by the Department of Justice Office of the Legal Counsel,which was based on information about the Taliban provided by the Department of Defense.68 Muchof the memorandum, however is conclusory in nature, and could have been strengthened by a morerobust and nuanced analysis. When the Soviet Union withdrew its military forces from Afghanistan in 1989, the Afghanmilitias that were previously allied against the Soviets turned on one another, causing significantdisorder and civil strife. In 1994, the Taliban—which was a Pashtun-dominated, ultra-conservativeIslamic group—began seizing Afghan territory, starting at its home base of Kandahar province andreaching the capital of Kabul in 1996. The Taliban succeeded in quelling the strife unleashed by thewarring militias, seizing ninety percent of Afghanistan’s territory, and imposing a strict form ofIslam throughout most of the country.69 Thus, the Taliban was not an organization initially formedto constitute the regular army of a government; the Taliban was a religious and a military movementthat ultimately swept across Afghanistan. As one commentator has noted: “Ironically, the Talibanwere a direct throwback to the military religious orders that arose in Christendom during theCrusades to fight Islam—disciplined, motivated and ruthless in attaining their aims.”70After seizing power, did the Taliban have a command-and-control system characteristic of“regular armed forces”? Much of its organization remained secretive, in part because the Talibanissued no press releases or policy statements and held no press conferences, and in part because its
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75 Taliban Militia (n.d.), athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/militia-taliban.htm (visited Sept. 21,2006).
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ban on photography and television made identification of its leaders difficult. Yet the Taliban didhave a military structure of sorts. At the top it was headed by Mullah Muhammed Omar, to whomreported the Chief of the General Staff, which in turn directed the Chief of the Army and the Chiefof the Air Force. Omar would either in person or by wireless radio communicate orders to militarycommanders such as allowing them to make an attack.71 Further, the Taliban had at least four armydivisions and an armored division. A military “shura” helped plan strategy, but apparently had nostrategic decision-making power.72 At the lower level, however, the idea of the Taliban as a regulararmed force begins to break down. The Taliban fighters (numbering some 25,000 to 30,000 men)were structured less like a normal army and more like a traditional tribal militia (or lashkar), inwhich personnel were constantly being shifted between the front lines back and their villages.73  Assuch, “there [was]  no clear military structure with a hierarchy of officers and commanders while unitcommanders [were] constantly being shifted around.”74 Globalsecurity.org maintains:The Taliban-led “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” lacked the administrative efficiency of astate. The military did not exist on a national basis. Some elements of the former Army, Airand Air Defense Forces, National Guard, Border Guard Forces, National Police Force(Sarandoi), and tribal militias existed, but were factionalized among various groups. TheTaliban's “army” was a coalition of militia formations composed of assorted armed groupswith varying degrees of loyalty, commitment, skill, and organizational coherence. Many hada history of switching sides and shifting loyalties prior to coming under the nominalcommand of the Taliban.75As for whether Taliban fighters were identifiable as part of an armed force and could bedistinguished from civilians, here too the factual analyses by the U.S. government and legalcommentators have been rather thin. Some assert that the Taliban “did not wear uniforms nor didthey display any other fixed distinctive emblem,”76 while others opine that “various Taliban units. . . may have been wearing a distinctive insignia as they wore a black head-covering of a similar
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type.”77 It again seems to be the case that the vast majority of Taliban fighters were not wearing anyparticular uniform, nor had any of the normal insignia that one normally associates with regulararmed forces (patches, berets, etc.), even in the developing world. The lack of such identificationtends to reinforce the idea that most Taliban fighters were not part of a regular armed force. Yet italso seems that Northern Alliance fighters were not wearing any normal uniform or insignia, butwere regarded by the United States as wearing “non-standard” uniforms by donning a certain styleof cap and scarf, so much so that U.S. special operations forces who dressed similarly were viewedas not dressing like a civilian.78 Why the Taliban were considered out-of-uniform while the NorthernAlliance were not was never made clear by the U.S. government. Further, even if the Taliban werelargely out-of-uniform, it still leaves room for the possibility that some units were distinctive, suchas personnel associated with an armored division. Perhaps the United States engaged in a systematicassessment of whether any such units existed and concluded that they did not, but public informationto date has not revealed such an effort.Finally, in terms of whether the Taliban adhered to the laws of war, the position taken by theUnited States on this issue was somewhat risky. Allegations by one side that another side hasengaged in war crimes has been a recurrent feature of armed conflict; linking POW status to suchallegations creates significant opportunities for summary denial of  protections to U.S. and alliedforces for spurious reasons.79 At the same time, no one has suggested that the Taliban ever trainedtheir forces in the laws of war, nor viewed themselves as bound by such rules. In the course of theTaliban’s conflict with the Northern Alliance, both sides committed horrific atrocities, with theTaliban carrying out summary executions of noncombatants, including women and children,arbitrarily detaining persons, forcibly relocating the civilian population, burning homes and crops,and using forced labor.80 Perhaps the more notorious atrocity was the torture and execution of formerAfghanistan President Najibullah after the Taliban entered Kabul.81 While members of regular armedforces do commit atrocities on occasion, and while that alone does not result in the violator losinghis status as a POW—let alone stripping an entire army of its entitlement to POW status—thesystematic violation of basic human rights by the Taliban suggests the existence of something other
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than a regular armed force.All things considered, and while opinions clearly differ, there seems to be a reasonable basisfor the U.S. government to have concluded that the vast majority of Taliban fighters were not“[m]embers of regular armed forces.” At the same time, it seems less reasonable to regard the higherlevels of Taliban military authorities, as well as discrete units, such as its armored division, as ipsofacto failing to constitute a regular armed force. For the United States to credibly maintain thatposition, it should have explained with greater detail and nuance why the Taliban en toto fell outsidethe scope of Article 4(A)(3). The failure to do so invites a similar lack of discrimination by othercountries in future conflicts in situations where some U.S. forces (e.g., special operations forces) arefound not have fulfilled the four criteria, leading to a denial of POW status to U.S. forces as a whole.The third issue is whether there was “doubt” about the status of the Taliban sufficient totrigger the requirements of Geneva III Article 5, which states that detainees “shall enjoy theprotection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by acompetent tribunal.” Here much turns on what it means to have “doubts” and who is supposed tohave them. Though there appears to have been some internal dissent, the leadership of the U.S.Executive Branch appears to have had no doubt, from early in the conflict, that all Taliban fightersas a group failed to fall within the scope of Article 4.82 To the extent that the issue is whether thedetaining power is uncertain, then Article 5 does not seem to be engaged. To the extent, however,that Article 5 is speaking to a broader viewpoint, doubts were certainly expressed by others, be it theICRC83 or legal commentators.84In my view, Article 5 is written essentially as a guide to governments as to how they shouldact in a time of war. When Article 5 notes “should any doubt arise” it appears to be directed atdoubts by the government who has taken custody of the detainee, and appears to be telling thegovernment to resolve those doubts in a particular manner. There is no sense of any other entity,including a protecting power or the ICRC, being involved in determining whether the doubt exists
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or whether it has been resolved. At the same time, it is implicit in Article 5 that the detaining poweris responsible for undertaking a serious and careful analysis as to whether persons who are detainedare entitled to status as POWs. Further, in my view, the spirit of the Convention suggests that suchan analysis should be communicated to any state or body that would otherwise serve as the protectingpower for such persons were they to be accorded POW status, so that the status of the persons andthe reasons for that status are clearly understood. Less clear is whether the decision that “no doubt exists” can occur on a group basis or mustbe resolved on a person-by-person basis. The text of Article 5 certainly suggests that groupdeterminations are permissible, in that it uses the word “persons” rather than “a person.” Further,past state practice reveals that classification by groups of persons has been undertaken whenconsidering POW status, such as the distinctions made between regular North Vietnamese armytroops, the Viet Cong main force, and the Viet Cong local force during the Vietnam War. The issueis not so much what status was actually accorded to those groups, as it is that determinations can bemade with respect to groups rather than on a individualized, case-by-case basis. In short, the U.S. government probably did have the leeway to determine that all the personsin its custody who were Taliban fighters captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan fell outside thescope of Geneva Convention III, though in doing so there may well have been some overbreath. Theerror by the United States was not so much in making that determination as it was in making surethat the persons in its custody were in fact part of the Taliban (or Al Qaeda), rather than a waywardtourist or relief worker. We now know that there were persons detained by the United States whohad nothing to do with either the Taliban or Al Qaeda; they were just in the wrong place at the wrongtime.85 Article 5 does not appear to encompass the process by which a state determines whether anindividual has committed a belligerent act against the detaining power; it assumes that such an acthas occurred and then addresses what is to be done if there is doubt about the person’s status as aPOW. Yet, again, it seems within the spirit of Article 5 to see the detaining power as having aresponsibility to review carefully and expeditiously whether persons detained are in fact combatantsat all. Such a review seems especially merited in situations where persons are captured on a chaoticbattlefield, where combatants and non-combatants by their dress are easily confused, or have beenhanded over by indigenous groups who are paid a bounty for doing so, as was the case inAfghanistan. As discussed in more detail below, the United States in 2004 created “combatant statusreview tribunals” to determine whether each detainee at Guantánamo Bay was properly classifiedas a combatant, and to release those who were not. The United States can and should be criticizedfor not doing more, and sooner, to ensure that such mistakes were not made.
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86 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, art. 4.
87 The  Pictet commentary is also a bit conflicted on the issue, asserting on the one handthat “[e]very person in  enemy hands must have some status” under the four conventions, 4PICTET COMMENTARY (1960), supra note 67, at 51, but on the other hand stating that GenevaConvention IV basically concerns civilians living in the enemy belligerent’s territory or interritory occupied by the enemy belligerent (which seems to exclude a civilian combatant who istaken into custody on the battlefield). Id. at 45.
88 Id. Nationals of a state that has not ratified the conventions are also not protected, butsince all states admitted to the United Nations have ratified or acceded to the 1949 GenevaConventions, this carve-out would not apply. 
89 See U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release on Operation Enduring Freedom Overview (Oct.1, 2001), at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2001/5194.htm.25
If the Taliban detainees are not entitled to POW status, that does not mean they lack anystatus under the laws of war. One possibility is that they should be accorded protections as civiliansin accordance with Geneva Convention IV, on a theory that the conventions were designed to ensurethat all persons would fall into some category of protection. Support for that position may be foundin Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV, which states in rather broad terms that the Conventionprotects persons who, “in any manner whatsoever, find themselves . . . in the hands of a Party to theconflict . . . of which they are not nationals.”86 On the other hand, the whole structure of Geneva Convention IV is oriented towardprotection of civilians detained either in occupied territory or in the detaining power’s own territory;there is little to suggest regulation of the civilian bearing arms on the battlefield.87 Moreover, Article4 itself makes clear that certain persons in the hands of a belligerent are not protected by GenevaConvention IV. Nationals of the detaining power itself are not protected. Nationals of a neutral state“who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent state” and nationals of a co-belligerent state arenot protected, so long as those states have diplomatic relations with the detaining state.88 As such,detainees at Guantánamo Bay who are nationals of a co-belligerent in the conflict against either theTaliban or Al Qaeda (e.g., Australia or the United Kingdom) clearly are not covered by the GenevaConvention IV. For this purpose, “co-belligerent” might be defined as the wide range of states thatprovided support for “Operation Enduring Freedom,” in the form of military assistance, financialassistance, intelligence, overflight and landing rights, or political support.89 Nationals of “neutralstates,” which might be defined as states other than Afghanistan who did not provide support forOperation Enduring Freedom, are not protected by Geneva Convention IV if they “find themselves”
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90 Ironically, this is apparently one area where detaining persons outside U.S. territorymay gives them greater rights than detaining them within.  
91 See Protocol I, supra note 34,  art. 45(3) (“Any person who has taken part in hostilities,who is not entitled to prisoner-of-war status and who does not benefit from more favorabletreatment in accordance with the Fourth Convention shall have the right at all times to theprotection of Article 75 of this Protocol.”); see also id., art 75(7)(b) (referring to persons who donot benefit from the general protections of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or Protocol I). Theofficial ICRC commentary on the protocol states that Article 45 “covers persons who not onlycannot claim prisoner-of-war status, but are also not protected persons under the FourthConvention.” INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THEADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at870 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter SANDOZ COMMENTARY]. The ICRC originallyproposed Article 75 so as to protect “any person who was, for one reason or another, unable toclaim a particular status, such as that of” POW or civilian internee. Id. at 864.26
in U.S. territory.90Further evidence that persons caught up in armed conflict regulated by the GenevaConventions are not necessarily protected, at the minimum, by the full range of Geneva ConventionIV may be seen in Geneva Convention IV Article 5, which sets forth circumstances where a civilianloses most of the protections under the Convention. Those circumstances include when the personis a spy or saboteur, or is suspected of engaging in activities hostile to the security of the detainingstate. Likewise, common Article 3 protects a certain category of persons but without providing themthe full status enjoyed by either POWs or protected civilians under the Geneva Convention. Perhapsmost importantly, Protocol I—which is viewed as clarifying and supplementing the 1949 GenevaConventions—explicitly envisages a situation where a person who takes part in hostilities and is thendetained may be found not entitled to either POW status or protected civilian status.91 In other words,Protocol I expressly states that the failure to qualify under Geneva Convention III does not ipso factoresult in protection under Geneva Convention IV.Thus, the 1949 Geneva Conventions do not, by their terms, create a seamless system of fullprotection of all individuals, whereby if you do not qualify under the comprehensive protections ofone convention, you automatically fall under the full protections of another. The further question,however, is whether Taliban personnel who fail to qualify as POWs should be considered protectedcivilians under Geneva Convention IV. Certainly they are not persons who simply happened to bepresent in the United States (or one of its allies) at the outbreak of the conflict, nor persons who justhappened to be living in an area of Afghanistan placed under occupation by the U.S.-led coalition.Thus, they do not squarely fit within the dominant paradigm of Geneva Convention IV. Moreover,they are not persons who were normally civilians, but happened to take part in the hostilities in thecourse of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, which would seem the most likely scenario by
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92 See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 78 (July 8).
93 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 104, para. 218 (June 27)(citing the Corfu Channel case). 27
which a combatant who fails to qualify for POW status might be placed in protected civilian status.Rather, the Taliban personnel were trained to engage in, and did engage in, armed hostilities on arather sustained basis, albeit in a capacity different from that of a regular army. While as a policymatter it might have been desirable for the United States to treat Taliban fighters in accordance withGeneva Convention III or IV, as a legal matter neither status was compelled. Rather, a key reasonnot to accord the Taliban fighters status as protected civilians is to avoid blurring the distinctionbetween combatants and non-combatants, which, of course, is a central organizing tenet of the 1949Geneva Conventions.92 Regarding persons engaged in active hostilities as protected civilians mayprovide greater protections to such combatants, but it concomitantly invites the treatment of non-combatant civilians as hostile threats to a belligerent, thereby diminishing the protections for suchcivilians.Assuming that the Taliban detainees are not entitled to either POW or protected civilianstatus under the Conventions, what is left for them appears to be the core standards advanced incommon Article 3. For while common Article 3 was designed to deal with “armed conflict not ofan international character,” over time it has come to be regarded as setting minimum standards ofhumanity applicable in all armed conflicts, including international armed conflicts. A key sourceoften cited for confirming this proposition is the statement by the International Court of Justice inthe 1986 Nicaragua v. United States case regarding the status of common Article 3. In commentingon common Article 3's rules, the Court stated:There is no doubt that, in the event of international armed conflicts, these rules alsoconstitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also toapply to international conflicts; and they are rules which, in the Court’s opinion, reflect whatthe Court in 1949 called “elementary considerations of humanity” . . . .93In other words, common Article 3 establishes rules “with legs,” capable of operating outside theconfines of the paradigm of conflicts “not of an international character.” As such, like the case ofthe Northern Alliance-versus-Taliban conflict discussed above, the regulatory road with respect tothe U.S.-led coalition-versus-Taliban international armed conflict leads ultimately to commonArticle 3. U.S.-Led Coalition v. Al Qaeda as a Non-Afghan Movement. Problems with applying theGeneva Conventions to the two prior conflicts pale in comparison to their application to the conflictbetween the U.S.-led coalition and Al Qaeda as a non-Afghan movement. 
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94 See generally The Global Reach of Al-Qaeda: Hearing Before the Subcomm. onInternational Operations and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, S. HRG. 107-390(2002); JANE CORBIN, AL-QAEDA: IN SEARCH OF THE TERROR NETWORK THAT THREATENS THEWORLD (2003); AL QAEDA NOW: UNDERSTANDING TODAY'S TERRORISTS (Karen J. Greenberged., 2005); LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11(2006).
95 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust,  Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War andDefense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and DueProcess in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1342 (2004) ("[A]ny conflictbetween the United States and al Qaeda as such cannot amount to war or trigger application ofthe laws of war."); Mary Ellen O’Connell, When is a War Not a War? The Myth of the GlobalWar on Terror, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3-4 (2005) (“Outside the real wars ofAfghanistan and Iraq, al Qaeda’s actions and our responses have been too sporadic and low-intensity to qualify as armed conflict.”).
96 See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 2, 7 (argument by the director of Human Rights Watch that the laws of war are notapplicable to the non-battlefield campaign against Al Qaeda).
97 See ICRC Statement on Conflict in Afghanistan, athttp://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList405/8C4F3170C0C25CDDC1257045002CD428
One might first try to view this conflict as a “state-versus-state” conflict. Yet the attacks of9/11 orchestrated and funded by Al Qaeda were the product of a global terrorist movement; theywere not directed by the de facto government of Afghanistan, although that government did tolerateand benefit from the presence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. At its essence, Al Qaeda is an armedSunni Islamist organization that is seeking to eliminate foreign influence in Muslim countries.Though its exact organization is shrouded in secrecy, most analysts describe it as comprisingnumerous independent and collaborative cells operating across multiple countries. As such, AlQaeda is not an entity temporally or geographically tied to the prior de facto government ofAfghanistan94 but, rather, an independent force engaged in a private war.Alternatively, one might try to view this conflict as a “state versus non-state actor” internalconflict. Yet that, too, is a poor fit for the Geneva Conventions paradigm, since the conflict istransnational in scale. Al Qaeda as an organization has a presence in numerous countries; it is notlimited in its operations to Afghanistan or even countries adjacent to Afghanistan.Thus, it is of no surprise that the ICRC and various scholars95 and leading non-governmentalorganizations96 see no basis for viewing the U.S. “global war” on Al Qaeda as an “armed conflict”within the meaning of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.97 For these observers, while the phrase “war
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A2.
98 See, e.g, Jinks, supra note 33, at 38 (“the September 11 attacks constituted the initiationof an ‘armed conflict’ within the meaning of . . . the Geneva Conventions.”); John C. Yoo &James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 211 (2003).
99 Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 1 (“This Protocol, which develops and supplementsArticle 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existingconditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of[Protocol I] and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armedforces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsiblecommand, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry outsustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.”) (emphasis added).29
on terrorism” is a catchy rhetorical device expressing a general policy of taking seriously a particularproblem (not unlike the “war on poverty” under the Johnson Administration or “war on drugs” inrecent years), this conflict is not really a “war” in the traditional sense, nor is there a discrete enemycalled “terrorism.” Consequently, they argue that—leaving aside those collected on the battlefieldin Afghanistan—the pursuit of Al Qaeda suspects should be undertaken in accordance with thenorms that operate with respect to any pursuit of persons believe to have violated criminal laws, andnot on the basis of the laws of war.If, as some scholars have done,98 one were to make the case for why this “state versus non-state actor transnational conflict” should fall within the scope of the laws of war, it would be alongthe following lines. First, common Article 3 does not expressly limit its scope to “internal” armedconflicts (or “civil wars”). The article does not, for example, refer to “armed conflict between thegovernment of a High Contracting Party and an opposing resistance movement within its territory”or some such thing, as was later done in Protocol II.99 Rather, the language speaks of “armed conflictnot of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”While that language might be viewed as solely directed at civil war, the language is susceptible toa broader interpretation. In short, “not of an international character” is capable of meaning “betweenany state and a non-state actor,” rather than meaning “internal armed conflict.”Second, “in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties” can be interpreted asreference to conduct rising to the level of armed conflict between those two types of participants inany territory of a party to the Geneva Conventions. While it might normally be the case that aparticular non-state actor is operating solely in the territory of a single state, if the non-state actor isoperating in multiple territories against a state actor, then the conflict remains governed by commonArticle 3, except in states that have not joined the Geneva Conventions. Since all states of the worldare now parties to the Geneva Conventions, that latter limitation has fallen into desuetude.
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100 Bothe, Partsch & Solf  write:A question under the Hague Regulations and the Third Convention involves the status ofan independent force which has no factual link to a party to an international armedconflict. In general, it may be said that such a force would probably be viewed as waginga private war. In any event, it would have no status better than that of insurgents in annon-international armed conflict, unless the movement they represent has such de factoobjective characteristics of a belligerency that the movement itself could be recognized asa Party to an international armed conflict.NEW RULES, supra note 33, at 235. They later note that “gangs of terrorists acting on their ownbehalf and no linked to an entity subject to international law are excluded” from the armed forces“of a party to the Conflict” under Article 43 of Protocol I. Id. at 237.
101 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
102 Id. at 2795-96. 30
Third, application of common Article 3 to a state-versus-nonstate actor transnational conflictappears consistent with the thinking that emerged from the negotiations of the additional protocols.As has been discussed, Protocol I Article 1(4) extended the reach of protections associated with“international armed conflicts” to certain situations where a state is in armed conflict with a non-stateactor (struggles against colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist regimes). There is noinherent reason why the protections associated with “non-international armed conflicts” might notbe extended to other situations where a state is in armed conflict with a non-state actor. Indeed,Bothe, Partsch & Solf—who participated in the protocol negotiations—have maintained that anindependent force engaged in a private war has a status akin to insurgents in a non-internationalarmed conflict,100 which suggests that the operative standards applicable to that war should be foundin common Article 3.Such points help explain the position taken by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.101There the Court found that even if Hamdan was not a part of the state-versus-state (i.e, coalition-versus-Taliban) conflict, he was part of an “armed conflict not of an international character” betweenthe United States and a non-state actor (Al Qaeda) that occurred in the territory of a party to theGeneva Conventions. According to the Court, the phrase “conflict not of an international character”in common Article 3 is broad enough to encompass a conflict between a state and any individualsnot associated with a state who are involved in a conflict in the territory of a state party.102 The Courtin part relied on the negotiating history of common Article 3.Although the official commentaries accompanying Common Article 3 indicate that animportant purpose of the provision was to furnish minimal protection to rebels involved in
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103 Id. at 2796 (footnote omitted). In its footnote, the Court cited to the InternationalCourt’s decision in the Nicaragua v. United States case referenced supra note 93.
104 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found (in the alternative) that the GenevaConventions did not apply to Hamdan because he was captured as part of a global U.S. war withAl Qaeda, one that was separate from the war with the Taliban occurring in Afghanistan.Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Hamdan was captured inAfghanistan in November 2001, but the conflict with al Qaeda arose before then, in otherregions, including this country on September 11, 2001.”).  In doing so, the circuit court wasdisagreeing with the district court, which had found that the conflict with Al Qaeda was notdistinct from the conflict with the Taliban. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161(D.D.C. 2004). The Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens, did not expressly accept that there was aglobal conflict with Al Qaeda distinct from the conflict in Afghanistan with the Taliban. Instead,the Court found that even if a separate conflict existed with Al Qaeda, and even if Hamdan wasdetained as a part of that conflict, then he would still be protected by common Article 3. 126S.Ct. 2749, ____ (2006) [see Part VI.D.ii]. The Court left open the possibility that Hamdanmight be protected by the full range of the Geneva Conventions, but also left open the possibilitythat the Geneva Conventions may not apply at all to persons detained outside Afghanistan.
105 For example, Bosnian Federation police in January 2002 transferred six Bosnianresidents of Algerian origin from a Sarajevo prison to U.S. custody. The men were transported toGuantánamo Bay for detention. The detainees were said to be suspects in an alleged plot to attackthe U.S. and U.K. embassies in Sarajevo. See European Parliament Press Release, MEPsExamine the Case of Six Prisoners Taken from Bosnia to Guantanamo (Apr. 26, 2006), athttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/017-7559-115-04-17-902-20060424I31
one kind of "conflict not of an international character," i.e., a civil war, see GCIII [Pictet]Commentary 36-37, the commentaries also make clear "that the scope of the Article must beas wide as possible," id., at 36. In fact, limiting language that would have rendered CommonArticle 3 applicable "especially [to] cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion,"was omitted from the final version of the Article, which coupled broader scope of applicationwith a narrower range of rights than did earlier proposed iterations. See GCIII Commentary42-43.103On the facts, the Court had before it a person who was detained on the battlefield inAfghanistan at the time of the armed conflict between the United States and the Taliban. Therefore,it is possible that the Court’s reasoning about the “armed conflict” is limited to the situation of AlQaeda persons detained in Afghanistan in the 2001-2002 time frame.104 The Court did not speak towhether any persons associated with Al Qaeda who are detained anywhere around the world fallwithin the scope of common Article 3, which may be an important issue since several of the personscurrently detained at Guantánamo Bay were not apprehended on the battlefield in Afghanistan.105 At
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PR07546-25-04-2006-2006-false/default_en.htm.
106 Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 2310.01E, paras. 2.2 & 4.2 (Sept. 5, 2006), athttp://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d2310_01e.pdf. 32
the same time, the Court did not expressly limit its holding to persons detained in Afghanistan andthe language quoted above can be read to speak to military actions worldwide by the United Statesagainst Al Qaeda. In the aftermath of the Hamdan decision, the Department of Defense issued adirective stating that it is Department of Defense policy that all U.S. forces “shall apply, withoutregard to a detainee’s legal status, at a minimum the standards articulated in Common Article 3 tothe Geneva Conventions of 1949,” for “all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized,and in all other military operations.”106 The directive makes no distinction between persons detainedin Afghanistan or abroad, nor limits its scope to persons associated with Al Qaeda. Thus, as was the case with the other types of conflicts, common Article 3 emerges as animportant set of default rules when considering post 9/11 armed conflict. Yet the Hamdan analyiswill not be the last word on this subject. There remain proponents for the proposition that Al Qaedadetainees should be accorded greater protections than just those contained in common Article 3—asPOWs under Geneva Convention III, as protected civilians under Geneva Convention IV, or simplyas humans under otherwise applicable human rights law. Conversely, despite the Hamdan decision,there will no doubt remain some skeptics as to whether even common Article 3 should apply to AlQaeda detainees, especially those who were not battlefield detainees in Afghanistan.  As demonstrated by the post-9/11 events, contemporary rules on the laws of war were notdesigned to take account of irregular forces or guerillas, and certainly not to take care of persons whoconducted themselves as brigands or outlaws. One can formulate various arguments for whymembers of irregular forces, whether they be Taliban or Al Qaeda, should be accorded a full rangeof protections under the Geneva Conventions, but historically the fit is not a good one. Moreover,the resistance of the United States to fitting the square peg of the Geneva Conventions to the roundhole of the conflict with Al Qaeda is not particularly surprising, especially in light of its vigorousrejection of the efforts in Protocol I to extend traditional protections to non-state actors fightingoppressive regimes. Nevertheless, while the full panoply of Geneva Convention protections may notbe available, the historical trend is also one that has favored development of certain core protectionsfor all persons engaged in armed conflict. That trend is discussed in the next section.IV.  The Dictates of Public ConscienceDespite the failure to apply the full panoply of Geneva Convention protections to irregularforces, there can be little doubt that the world has changed since Lieber’s time. The idea of simplysubjecting a brigand to death upon capture is today unacceptable. One can point to manydevelopments in international law that have fostered protections for even persons who are
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107 See Christof Heyns & Frans Viljoen, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMANRIGHTS TREATIES ON THE DOMESTIC LEVEL (2002); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuringthe Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2003); but see Oona A. Hathaway,Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (arguing that suchtreaties are relatively ineffective); Oona A. Hathaway, Testing Conventional Wisdom, 14 EUR. J.INT’L L. 185 (2003) (same).
108 G.A. Res. 217 (Dec. 10, 1948).
109 Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
110 Id., art. 4(1). 33
responsible for even the most heinous of acts. Though senior leaders in the government of NaziGermany had committed horrific atrocities, it was ultimately accepted by the Allied Powers thatthose leaders would be punished only after a public prosecution before a tribunal at Nuremberg, atwhich they would be represented by counsel and able to challenge the evidence against them (somewere in fact acquitted). The past dozen years have seen a flourishing of such international criminaltribunals, from the Hague to Tanzania, from Sierra Leone to Cambodia and East Timor. The relativesuccesses and failures of those tribunals is less relevant then the fact that our contemporary globalsociety regards even individuals who appear to have committed genocide, crimes against humanity,and grave war crimes to be entitled to certain core standards of treatment. The parallel development of human rights law since World War II reinforces the idea of coreprotections even for persons allegedly responsible for heinous acts. Modern human rights law centersaround important treaties and institutions that have had a significant, if not systematic, influence onthe constitutions, laws, judicial decisions, and policies of states worldwide.107 A key fount for humanrights law, the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights,108 heralded a series of important rightspossessed by individuals as against government power: all persons are born free and equal in dignityand rights (art. 1); all persons have the right to life, liberty, and security (art. 3); no one shall be heldin slavery or tortured (arts. 4-5); all persons are entitled to equal protection under the law (arts. 6-7);there shall be no arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (art. 9); all persons have the right to a fair trial(arts. 10-11); and each person has a right to sue to vindicate these rights (art. 8). The 1966International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights109 embellishes on such core standards, andfurther sets forth certain fundamental rights that cannot be derogated from even in time of nationalemergency,110 including the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life, the right not to be tortured, theright not to be held in slavery, the right not to be found guilty of an offense made criminal ex postfacto, and the right to recognition as a person before the law. As of 2006, the ICCPR has 154 parties,including the United States.The application of such instruments as a matter of law to particular detained persons raises
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111 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 24, pmbl.
112 See the “denunciation clause” common to the four conventions. Geneva Convention I,supra note 26, art. 63(4); Geneva Convention II, supra note 26, art. 62(4); Geneva ConventionIII, supra note 25, art. 142; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, art. 158(4) (Denunciation“shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound tofulfil by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages establishedamong civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.”)
113 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 1(2) (“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by otherinternational agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority ofthe principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles ofhumanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”); see NEW RULES, supra note 33, at 38. 34
special issues, since the Universal Declaration is not a binding treaty and the ICCPR is interpretedby the United States as not applying to U.S. conduct outside U.S. territory. Yet regardless of suchtechnical arguments, the historical arc of such human rights law helps explain why common Article3 has emerged as a common denominator for all persons captured in the course of armed conflict.While the full range of Geneva Convention protections are not easily grafted onto the contemporarythreat of global terrorism, common Article 3 expresses those “elementary considerations ofhumanity” that the global community has come to embrace. Adapting the laws of war to address new circumstances is a notion readily accepted withinsuch laws. An enduring element of the 1899 and 1907 Hague conferences is the recognition thatcodes of conduct cannot address all conceivable actions that may occur, especially as newtechnological developments arise. Consequently, the drafters of the 1907 Hague Convention on landwarfare inserted a clause providing that even if a law-of-war code did not expressly apply to aspecific situation, states were still bound to certain dictates of humanity.Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting Partiesdeem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principlesof the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples,from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.111This clause—known as the Martens Clause after the Russian diplomat who called for itsinsertion—is binding treaty law upon states, including the United States. The clause was maintainedin the 1949 Geneva Conventions112 and adopted in a somewhat more modern form in Protocol Iwithout any controversy.113 Though it has not figured in the U.S. government’s discussions of theapplication of the Geneva Conventions in the “war on terror,” the Martens Clause is an importantmeans for clarifying law of war instruments where they fall short. Thus, in the 1996 advisory opinion
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114 See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 92, para. 78.
115 See supra text accompanying note 31.
116 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 75(2)(b).
117 See supra text accompanying note 31.35
of the International Court of Justice on the legality of nuclear weapons, the Court found no treatyprovision or customary international law norm specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.However, the Court relied upon the enduring significance of the Martens Clause to find that certaincardinal principles contained in law of war treaties (the need to distinguish combatants from non-combatants and the need to avoid unnecessary suffering to combatants) must be applied to newforms of military technology.114 As such, the Court found that the use of nuclear weapons wasgenerally prohibited.This confluence of events—the receptivity to change as reflected in the Martens Clause, therise of human rights protections, and the belief that even those believed to have committed atrocitiesare entitled to certain rights—helps explain why common Article 3 has gained such traction in thepost-9/11 era; why all roads led to it. Yet there are also less altruistic explanations. Internationalhumanitarian law is built, to a certain extent, on a belief by countries that they can maintain betterdiscipline among their armed forces if they operate in accordance with certain standards of decency;the path to anarchy is too well-trod when no standards exist. Further, there is a deep-seated belief(or at least hope) that by one side promoting such standards, there is a greater likelihood that theother side will apply them as well, at least in some measure. With a terrorist organization such as AlQaeda, or a government such as the Taliban, placing faith in minimum standards of protection  maybe misplaced, but even the most heinous of actors have been known to show mercy, and efforts topromote such compassion, all things being equal, are rational and understandable.Yet our understanding of the core protections of common Article 3 should not stop with itslanguage, for common Article 3 also has experienced refinement since 1949. When Protocol I wasadopted in 1977, it contained in Article 75 on Fundamental Guarantees a series of provisions thattrack the core protections of common Article 3 and deepen our understanding of them. Thus,whereas common Article 3 refers to a prohibition on “outrages against personal dignity, in particular,humiliating and degrading treatment,”115 Article 75 embellishes by reference to “outrages uponpersonal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and anyform of indecent assault.”116 Similarly, whereas common Article 3 briefly speaks to the right ofdetainees to be tried only by “a regularly constituted court affording all judicial guarantees which arerecognized as indispensable by civilized peoples,”117 Article 75 describes over the course of severalparagraphs what constitutes “principles of regular judicial procedure,” including the right to conductone’s defense and be present at one’s trial, the presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent,
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119 NEW RULES, supra note 33, at 457.
120 Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 45(3).
121 Id., art. 75(8).
122 See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 299-383 (Jean Marie-Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
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the right to cross-examine witnesses, and protection against double jeopardy.118Article 75 is directed at persons who are “affected” by the conflict, are in the hands of aParty, and who do not already benefit from more favorable treatment outside Article 75's protections.As such, the “main function of the article is to fill gaps in treaty law by providing protection forcategories of persons not already protected by such law,”119 such as captured persons who engagedin hostilities but are not entitled to POW status.120 Article 75 thus is an appropriate touchstone fordetermining the rights of non-state actors, such as alleged members of a terrorist organization,engaged in armed conflict against a state. At the same time, Article 75 provides that it does not limitor infringe upon other applicable international law; it is not a lex specialis that displaces other humanrights protections.121Since the United States is not a party to Protocol I (nor Afghanistan for that matter), its termsare not binding as a matter of treaty law with respect to the conflicts discussed above. Nevertheless,there is strong evidence that Article 75 has passed into customary international law. More than 160states have adhered to Protocol I, including Article 75, and that no state has announced that Article75 does not reflect customary international law. The ICRC views these fundamental guarantees ashaving passed into customary international law.122 Most scholars in the field123 and internationaltribunals that have addressed the issue, such as the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, havemaintained that Article 75 reflects customary international law. That Commission has stated:30. The Commission views Article 75 of Protocol I as reflecting particularlyimportant customary principles. . . . These guarantees distill basic human rights mostimportant in wartime. Given their fundamental humanitarian nature and their correspondencewith generally accepted human rights principles, the Commission views these rules as partof customary international law.31. Article 75 of Protocol I “acts as a “legal safety net” guaranteeing a minimum
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125 See Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of CustomaryInternational Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J.INT’L L. & POL’Y 419 (1987) (statement by the U.S. Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser).Matheson recently reiterated that the Reagan Administration “accepted as customary law . . .Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, which set forth a series of fundamental guarantees that wouldapply to all persons in the hands of a party to a conflict, even if they did not qualify for POWtreatment. This provision was of course designed to fill the gaps in the 1949 Conventions tosome degree.” Michael J. Matheson, Continuity and Change in the Law of War: 1975 to 2005:Detainees and POWs, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 543, 546-47 (2006).
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standard of human rights for all persons who do not have protection on other grounds.”124While the United States did not ratify Protocol I, it also did not object to Article 75 as a partof customary international law, and thus has not placed itself in the position of being a persistentobjector to such a rule. Indeed, the U.S. government has publicly embraced Article 75. After theadoption of Protocols I and II, the U.S. government “completed an extensive review of theAdditional Protocols, both from the viewpoint of military considerations and from the viewpoint ofnational policy.”125 That internal review concluded in 1986 that the United States should not submitProtocol I to the Senate, but also determined that “the United States will consider itself legally boundby the rules contained in Protocol I . . . to the extent that they reflect customary international law,either now or as it may develop in the future.”126 Among the rules found in Protocol I that werealready customary international law, according to the relevant Department of Defense memorandum,were the fundamental guarantees of Article 75.127 Describing publicly the outcome of the review, theU.S. Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser stated in 1987:We support in particular the fundamental guarantees contained in article 75, such asthe principle that all persons who are in the power of a party to a conflict and who do notbenefit from more favorable treatment under the Conventions be treated humanely in allcircumstances and enjoy, at a minimum, the protections specified in the Conventions withoutany adverse distinction based upon race, sex, language, religion or belief, political or otheropinion, national or social origin, or any similar criteria. We support the principle that these
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persons not be subjected to violence to life, health, or physical or mental well-being, outragesupon personal dignity, the taking of hostages, or collective punishments, and that no sentencebe passed and no penalty executed except pursuant to conviction pronounced by an impartialand regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regularjudicial procedure.128Thus, the U.S. government as of 1986 regarded Article 75 as reflecting customaryinternational law. Today, twenty years later, there can be little doubt that Article 75 is well-settledcustomary international law. Indeed, the Department of State Legal Adviser in 2003 asserted that“the United States . . . does regard the provisions of Article 75 as an articulation of safeguards towhich all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled.”129 In the Hamdan case, the plurality opinioncited to that statement when finding that the provisions of Article 75 relating to trial protections are“indisputably part of . . . customary international law.”130 The four justices had no difficulty in usingthe more detailed provisions of Article 75 as a means of illuminating the more general obligationsset forth in common Article 3. In short, the “dictates of public conscience” are aptly captured incommon Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and are further elaborated in Article 75 ofProtocol I, both of which are legally binding upon the United States.Assuming that these are the principal sources of international humanitarian law with respectto the treatment of persons in armed conflict with terrorist organizations, do they help answer someof the key questions that will arise in years to come? Considerable attention has already been paidto whether the conditions of captivity accorded to detainees in the “war on terrorism” are compatiblewith international humanitarian law, including the methods employed by the United States ininterrogating detainees and the rendition of detainees to countries where they are tortured andabused. One issue that has not received sufficient attention in legal commentary to date concerns theduration of detention of unprivileged combatants and the conditions under which their captivityshould be terminated. The remainder of this essay briefly addresses that issue.V.  Termination of CaptivityOne of the most important issues at present is whether terrorist suspects initially classifiedas unlawful combatants may be detained virtually indefinitely by the United States without trial.
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Most of the 430 detainees131 at Guantánamo Bay in late 2006 have been in U.S. custody for fiveyears, longer than the duration of U.S. involvement in World War II. Detaining individuals withouttrial, even in time of war, is an extraordinary measure that imposes significant physical and mentalburdens on the detainee. In June 2006, three of the detainees committed suicide. Consequently, theobligations of humane treatment both during the detention and in repatriation should be taken quiteseriously.Applicable Law. To the extent that the issue of termination of captivity has been addressed,the standard assertion by the U.S. government is that the detainees may be held for “the duration ofthe hostilities,” after which they must be repatriated to their country of nationality.132 The SupremeCourt in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, appears to have adopted that view in the context of consideringHamdi’s objection that Congress, in the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF)statute,133 had not authorized indefinite detention. The Court stated that “[i]t is a clearly establishedprinciple of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.”134 The general assertion that all detainees at Guantánamo Bay may be detained for the “durationof hostilities” is doubtful. First, that assertion may be overbroad in covering all persons detainedworldwide in the “war on terrorism.” While detention of persons on the battlefield in Afghanistan,whether the person is associated with the Taliban or with Al Qaeda, seems fairly to fall within thescope of the evolving laws of war, the detention of persons outside Afghanistan who are suspectedof connections to global terrorism is more problematic. The laws of war operate within temporal andgeographic realms; considerable attention is given to when it can be said that an “armed conflict”has arisen and ended, and to where it is that protected persons are located (in enemy territory, inoccupied territory, in neutral territory, etc.) These rules do not fit well the new paradigm of an armedconflict between a state and a non-state actor that is transnational in nature, especially when that non-state actor is not a centralized organization. Links to Al Qaeda may be found in numerous countries,not because the indigenous factions there are actively engaged in a coordinated fight against theUnited States, but because Al Qaeda attracts movements that seek to reduce Western influence in
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their countries or region, be it Somalia, Algeria, or elsewhere.135 A principal architect of the radicalthinking that came to characterize Al Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Suri, has written that Al Qaeda is notan organization, it is not a group, nor do we want it to be. . . . It is a call, a reference, amethodology.”136 If that is correct, it becomes very strained to view all persons suspected of ties toAl Qaeda as unlawful combatants engaged in an armed conflict with the United States. It would beas if, during the Cold War, the United States decided to treat all persons suspected of beingcommunists as combatants because communist groups were fighting the United States in places likeVietnam or Korea.While it may be the case that Al Qaeda persons detained outside Afghanistan fall within thesame rules at those detained on the battlefield, it may also be the case that the rules are different.Perhaps in recognition of this fact, the Supreme Court in Hamdi, after stating the general principleof the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities, went on to note that “[i]fthe practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informedthe development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.”137 Indeed, the Court appearsto have been influenced by the fact that Hamdi allegedly took up arms with the Taliban and thatactive fighting against Taliban forces remained ongoing in Afghanistan. If Al Qaeda suspects picked up in places other than the battlefield in Afghanistan are notregarded as combatants under the laws of war, then they would fall under the same rules that applyto any transnational criminal; they could be arrested and tried in regular courts for transnationalcrime, and otherwise could be closely monitored by law enforcement authorities. They could not,however, simply be detained without trial indefinitely.Second, even if one assumes that all the detainees at Guantánamo Bay should be treatedalike, the general assertion that they may be detained for the “duration of hostilities” still isproblematic. That general assertion appears based on Article 118 of Geneva Convention III(“[p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of activehostilities”), and perhaps on the analogous Article 133 of Geneva Convention IV (any internmentof civilians “shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities”). Persons who have beenprosecuted in accordance with the conventions, of course, may be held even after the cessation ofhostilities, but they remain under the protections of the conventions until the completion of their
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138 Article 20 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides that “[a]fter the conclusion ofpeace, the repatriation of prisoners of war shall be carried out as quickly as possible.”
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sentences and their release.The sentiment expressed by the 1949 Geneva Convention provisions in favor of expeditiousrelease after the cessation of hostilities was animated by the problems that were experienced priorto 1949. The 1907 Hague Regulations138 and the 1929 Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War139were interpreted as allowing a detaining power not to repatriate until either the conclusion of anarmistice agreement or even a final peace agreement. Since those agreements might take months oreven years after the cessation of active hostilities, the repatriation of millions of prisoners of war inboth the world wars were considerably delayed.140 Consequently, the 1949 Geneva Conventions (andProtocol I) sought to detach the issue of repatriation from the conclusion of a formal agreement, andinstead tie the matter to core justification for detention—i.e., whether the individual would pose athreat to the detaining power after release. In this sense, the obligation became a unilateral oneimposed on the detaining power, and not one contingent on some formal of consent from theopposing belligerent. For the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the threat no longer existed once thehostilities were over.Yet, regardless of the duration of the conflict, Geneva Convention III and Geneva ConventionIV are oriented toward an individualized assessment of the circumstances arising with respect toindividual POWs and civilian internees. Under Geneva Convention III, a detaining power mayrelease a particular POW on “parole or promise,”141 and may also  “conclude agreements with a viewto the direct repatriation or interment in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who haveundergone a long period of captivity.”142 Likewise, the standard set forth in Geneva Convention IVfor release of civilian internees is not tied to the cessation of hostilities; it provides that civilianinternees “shall be released by the Detaining Power as soon as the reasons which necessitated hisinternment no longer exist.”143 Moreover, as previously noted, the most relevant standards for the detainees in Guantánamo
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are not those relating to POWs or civilian internees, since the Guantánamo detainees have not beenclassified as such. The more relevant standards arise under  common Article 3 and Protocol I Article75. Common article 3 is silent about termination of captivity. Article 75(3) of Protocol I, however,does address the matter, stating:Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict shall beinformed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these measures havebeen taken. Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offenses, such persons shall bereleased with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstancesjustifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.144The first sentence tracks the language of Article 9(2) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights (ICCPR),145 a treaty that had been adopted before the Protocol I negotiations and thatthe Supreme Court plurality in Hamdan used to inform its understanding of Protocol I Article 75.146The second sentence indicates that unless the person is arrested or detained for a penal offense, thenthey are to be released with “minimum delay” and as soon as the circumstances justifying thedetention cease to exist. There is no linkage here to the conclusion of a peace agreement as is thecase for POWs under the 1907 Hague Regulations. Yet neither is there any linkage to release onlyafter cessation of active hostilities, as is the case generally for POWs under 1949 Geneva ConventionIII. Rather, the standard is closer to that of Geneva Convention IV, whereby regardless of theduration of the conflict, the individual is to be released once the reasons necessitating the detentionno longer exist. The official ICRC commentary on the protocol maintains that there is an important linkbetween these two sentences. The first sentence speaks to a particular temporal period:  the periodbetween the time that the person is detained and the time that they are informed of the reasons forthe detention.  According to the ICRC, this period should last no more than ten days:Legal practice in most countries recognizes preventive custody, i.e., a period duringwhich the police or public prosecutor can detain a person in custody without having to chargehim with a specific accusation; in peacetime this period is no more than two or three days,but sometimes it is longer for particular offences (acts of terrorism) and in time of armedconflict it is often prolonged. Useful indications can be found in national legislation. In anycase, even in time of armed conflict, detaining  a person for longer than, say, ten days without
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informing the detainee of the reasons for his detention would be contrary to this paragraph.147Turning to the second sentence, the ICRC commentary states thatit seems clear that detainees not charged with a criminal offence within the period mentionedmust be released; this is laid down in all national legislation. However, in time of armedconflict States often assume the right to take security measures with regard to certain personswho are considered dangerous.148The implication of this commentary is that the decision whether to charge a detainee mustbe taken within ten days after capture; if the decision is not to charge, then the person should bereleased. If the person is considered dangerous, then the detention can continue, but it must end onceperson is no longer viewed as dangerous. If that analysis is correct, then the standards applicable topersons detained by the United States in the “war” against Al Qaeda require that the United Statesrelease such detainees immediately upon determination that they no longer represent a threat to theUnited States or its allies, not upon the cessation of hostilities. The process that has now unfoldedfor the release of detainees, as discussed in the next subsection, supports this conclusion, in that theUnited States is releasing detainees upon determining that they no longer constitute a threat to theUnited States and its allies.Process for Determining if Continued Detention is Merited. Neither common Article 3 norProtocol I Article 75 addresses the method by which a detaining power should determine whethera detainee is considered dangerous. However, Protocol I Article 75(3) “was based on Articles 43 and132 of the Fourth Convention, which are concerned with periodic review of internment decisions.”149The standards set forth in those articles called for: (1) review of the internment by an appropriatecourt or administrative board; (2) periodic reviews conducted at least twice a year; (3)communication to a protecting power, which could be the ICRC, of the names of the detainees andthe decisions of the court or board; and (4) release “as soon as the circumstances which necessitatedhis internment no longer exist.” These standards appear to be appropriate ones to apply inconsidering the process for a detaining powers compliance with Article 75(3).In March 2004, the United States initiated two types of review processes concerning thedetainees. First, it established a system of combatant status review tribunals (CSRT), which were
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instituted to determine whether the detainee was properly classified as a “combatant.”150 The solepurpose of this process was to determine whether each detainee at Guantánamo Bay was properlydetermined to be a “combatant,” not to determine whether they were a “prisoner of war” since thatdetermination that had previously been made by the president on a generalized basis. Thus, theCRST process helped determine if an innocent tourist or relief worker was captured in the mistakenbelief that he was a combatant. As a part of this process, the detainees were not assigned lawyers,but were assigned U.S. military personnel to assist them in representing their views to the tribunal.By March 2005, 558  proceedings had been held, resulting in a determination that 520 persons werecombatants and 38 persons were non-combatants.151Second, the United States initiated an annual review process in which each detainee wouldbe assessed in order to determine whether the individual continued to pose a threat to the UnitedStates or its allies, or whether he should be released. 152 Final review procedures were adopted inMay 2004153 and an implementation directive was issued in September 2004.154 Under this reviewprocess, an administrative review board (ARB), composed of three military officers with relevanttraining, assesses each detainee and recommends whether the individual should continue to be
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detained.155 The final decision, however, rests with a Department of Defense civilian, appointed bythe president with the advice and consent of the Senate156 (the secretary of the navy was sodesignated for this task). “To the extent consistent with security,” the government of the detainee’snationality may submit to the review board written information “of any nature, including informationrelated to the threat posed by the enemy combatant to the United States and its allies.”157 Adesignated military officer presents to the board the reasons and evidence for and against continueddetention.158 The detainee may present information to the board at a hearing and is supposed to haveaccess to the presentations of his home government and the military officer “to the extent it is bothnecessary to his presentation . . . and consistent with national security.”159 The detainee is assistedby a military officer, who may also serve as his spokesman at the board hearing.160 In December2004, the Department of Defense began conducting these administrative review hearings.161 ByDecember 2005, a first round of 464 ARB proceedings had been held, resulting in decisions tocontinue to detain at Guantánamo 330 persons, to transfer to other countries 119 persons, and torelease 14 persons.162 By November 2006, a second round of ARB proceedings had resulted in nofurther decisions to release individuals,163 but these reviews will continue on an annual basis.
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The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,164 which was issued in part as a reaction to the SupremeCourt’s decision in Rasul v. Bush,165 imposes certain requirements on the CSRT and ARB processes,and limits the remedy available to detainees who seek to challenge their status. The Secretary ofDefense is required to report to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees regarding theCSRT and ARB procedures, as well as the procedures in operation for status determinationsregarding detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan. The statute also sets forth the rules of evidence to beused regarding admissibility of coerced statements, the characteristics of the reviewing authority, andcertain other procedural issues. Finally, it precludes federal court review of ARB determinations, andgrants the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals exclusive and limited166 jurisdiction to hear appeals of thefinal decisions of the CSRT.There would appear to be no basis for arguing on their face that the CSRT and ARBprocesses run afoul of the customary international law obligation regarding release of unprivilegedcombatants, as expressed in Protocol I Article 75 and read in light of Geneva Convention IV Articles43 and 132. The need for continued detention is periodically considered by an  administrative boardcomposed of persons competent to make such decisions, after receiving relevant information fromthe detainee, and then is reviewed at a more senior level. Those decisions are likely communicatedto the ICRC, which has been granted access to the Guantánamo detainees since their arrival inGuantánamo in early 2002. Further transparency exists in the reports provided to Congress regardingthose determinations and the public release of associated of documents, transcripts, an decisions
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from the proceedings.167 Whether those procedures are being conducted in a manner that is trulymeaningful is outside the scope of this essay and will no doubt be the subject of scrutiny as moreinformation becomes available.Persons Transferred to Other Countries. Most of the detainees were found by the CRSTproceedings to be combatants and by the ARB proceedings to be a continuing threats to the UnitedStates and its allies. For many of these detainees, however, the ARB proceedings determined thatthey could be transferred to other countries, who could then take responsibility for monitoring,detaining or prosecuting them. From 2002 to 2006, approximately 345 detainees at Guantánamowere transferred to the custody of other countries.168 As of November 2006, it appears that the UnitedStates plans to transfer approximately another 110 detainees, but has not yet done so.169 Where the detainee has been transferred to his country of nationality, any U.S. obligationsarising under the Geneva Conventions would appear to end. If a detainee has not been transferredto his country of nationality, however, it seems appropriate to regard the United States as having acontinuing obligation to ensure that the country of transfer abides by the standards of commonArticle 3 and Protocol I Article 75 in its treatment of the transferee, as is the case with respect totransfers of POWs under Geneva Convention III.170Persons Deemed Eligible for Release. Between September 2004 and March 2005, the CSRTproceedings determined that 38 persons detained at Guantánamo—about five percent of the personswho spent time there—were not combatants 171 The first round of ARB proceedings ending in 2005
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determined that 14 detainees were no longer a threat to the United States or its allies and could bereleased, and similar findings presumably will occur in the future. Given such findings, the UnitedStates was under an obligation to release the individuals immediately; there was no basis for statingthat the detention remained permissible due to ongoing hostilities against the Taliban in Afghanistanor against Al Qaeda worldwide. These persons, however, have not been released immediately. The U.S. Department of Statesought to coordinate the return of the 38 individuals deemed to be non-combatants to their countriesof nationality,172 but experienced difficulties in doing so.173 The first five were released by March2005,174 yet it took as long as November 2006 before all 38 detainees were released.175 The speedwith which persons are released who are no longer deemed  a threat under the ARB process isunclear; the Department of Defense seems to lump such persons together in its data on personsawaiting transfer to other countries. The reasons for the continued delay in releasing persons whohave been found either not to be combatants or not to pose any further threat appear to fall into threecategories: detainees who could not be returned to their country of origin out of a fear they wouldbe mistreated; detainees whose country of origin would not allow their return; and detainees whowere either stateless or whose apparent country of origin challenged their nationality.
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178 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2000). For the Immigration and Naturalization Serviceimplementing regulations, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c) & 208.18 (2005). For the Department ofState implementing regulations, see 22 C.F.R. pt.  95, §§ 95.2-.4 (2005). Taking account of such concerns is consistent with the practical implementation of thelaws of war. As far back as the aftermath of the Korean War, it has been accepted that inexceptional cases prisoners need not be forced to return to their homeland against their will, andthat the obligation to treat them humanely includes taking account of the conditions of they mightface upon repatriation. See G.A. Res. _____, para. 2 (Dec. 3, 1952) (affirming that force shall notbe used against POWs either to prevent or to effect their repatriation, and that they shall at alltimes be treated humanely); see also 3 PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 67, at 547-48; JaroMayda, The Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 414 (1953);R.R. Baxter, Asylum to Prisoners of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 489 (1953). Having said that,the soundest course of action in the event that detainees are not to be repatriated is to have theirconsent verified by an entity other than the detaining power, such as the ICRC.49
With respect to the first category, Article 75 does not provide for an exception where thedetainee does not wish to return to his country of origin for fear of mistreatment. Although that issuewas discussed in the course of negotiations of both Geneva Convention III and Protocol I regardingrepatriation, exceptions were not adopted out of a concern that prisoners might not be able to makea free choice while still in captivity.176 Nevertheless, contemporary human rights must be viewed asnow informing this obligation to repatriate, especially in light of Article 75(8). For example, Article3 of the Convention against Torture prohibits the return of an individual to a country where a personwould likely be tortured.177 The United States implements this obligation through a statute thatdeclares that it “shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite or otherwise effect theinvoluntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing thepersons would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person isphysically present in the United States.”178 With respect to the second and third categories, theUnited States presumably impressd upon the detainee’s country of origin that it is a violation ofinternational law to render a person stateless. Yet for all three categories, the United States was under an obligation to release the detaineeswith the minimum delay possible, and that release is not contingent upon an ability to return thedetainee to a particular country. Consequently, in my view, the United States was obligated, at aminimum, to parole such individuals into the United States pending a final resolution of their status.Our immigration laws are fully capable of handling persons in non-immigrant status who are paroled
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in the United States pending proceedings for their removal to another country. The only reason notto do so is a political one; the embarrassment of  bringing into the United States and allowing freemovement to persons previously declared to be terrorists/unlawful combatants. Yet it was the choiceof the United States, for its own benefit, to bring these individuals to Guantánamo from the placesthey were abroad; to the extent that the United States experienced difficulty in returning thosepersons, it should bear the burden of that difficulty, not the individuals.By way of example, the United States captured in Afghanistan and brought to GuantánamoChinese nationals who were ethnic Uighur Muslims.179 In 2004 (even before initiation of the CSRTand ARB proceedings), the U.S. government determined that these individuals were either not enemycombatants or posed no risk to the United States and its allies, and therefore could be released. Sincemany Chinese Uighurs oppose the government of China, these individuals feared that they wouldbe imprisoned, persecuted or tortured if returned to China. The United States apparently agreed andengaged in an extensive effort to find a country willing to accept the Uighurs.180 Ultimately itsucceeded for all of them, but only two years after they had been determined to pose no threat to theUnited States.181 Such lengthy detention of innocent persons is unconscionable and a violation of theUnited States obligations under common Article 3 and Protocol I Article 75.Persons Neither Transferred Nor Released. As of late 2006, there remain 430 personsdetained at Guantánamo who are regarded as threats to U.S. security. Perhaps some 60 to 80 of thosepersons will be tried before the U.S. system of military commissions that will now operate underMilitary Commissions Act of 2006.182 While the United States is still engaged in an aggressive effortto transfer many of these individuals to other countries, it has encountered considerable resistanceto these transfers, including from close allies such as the United Kingdom. These detainees presentthe most difficult scenario for balancing the needs of the security of the detaining power against therights of protected persons to humane treatment. With respect to the Taliban detainees, the United States, its allies, and the government ofAfghanistan should be permitted to continue the detentions so long as the individuals remain a threat,
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which may be the case as long as the Taliban remain involved in active hostilities against thegovernment of Afghanistan.183 If those hostilities conclude, the detainees should be repatriated assoon as possible to their country of origin. Such repatriation should not be delayed based on the lackof a formal agreement concerning the cessation of hostilities, the integration of the Taliban into theAfghan government, amnesty, or any related matter. If it is more likely than not that the detainee willbe subject to human rights abuses upon his repatriation, such as torture, then the repatriation shouldnot go forward, and an alternative means of release should be developed until circumstances change.In the event that the United States withdraws its forces from Afghanistan prior to the cessation ofthose hostilities, the United States would be withdrawing from the conflict and would no longer havea basis under the laws of war for detaining Taliban personnel.With respect to Al Qaeda detainees, the United States must continue to engage in periodicreviews of the threat posed by each individual detainee. Obviously, that threat can diminish overtime, in light of the age, health, and psychological condition of the detainee. Moreover, the processfor review must take account of the exact relationship of the detainee to Al Qaeda. As indicatedbefore, Al Qaeda is a network of groups or cells, some of which are rather peripheral to its strategicactivities. Splinter groups in Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere may fall under the rubric of Al Qaeda, buttheir fortunes may change dramatically over time in terms of their vitality and significance. As such,if a detainee is connected to a group that, for whatever reason, has been thoroughly routed, and if itis probable that the detainee would return to his homeland without re-engaging with his Al Qaedafaction, then that fact should be taken into account in any threat assessment. In other words, AlQaeda should not be viewed as a monolithic entity; the threat of the detainee should be gauged basedon the part of Al Qaeda to which he relates, rather than the overall threat of the existence of AlQaeda. Wounded or Sick in Detention. The longer the United States holds detainees, the more likelysignificant issues will arise with respect to their health and well-being. Already, difficult issues havearisen, such as whether a detainee should be transferred to the United States (or another country) for
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heart surgery, or whether it should be performed at Guantánamo Bay.184 Ultimately, questions mustbe addressed about whether certain detainees should be released for health reasons.The standards set forth in common Article 3 and in Protocol I Article 75 do not address theissue of repatriating detainees who are sick or severely injured. Yet given the requirement forhumane treatment in both common Article 3 and Article 75, there are compelling reasons to viewthe standards set forth in Geneva Convention III Article 110 as establishing general benchmarks forhumane treatment on this issue. Article 110 provides that the following POWs should be repatriatedeven during the course of the conflict:(1) Incurably wounded and sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravelydiminished.(2) Wounded and sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover withinone year, whose condition requires treatment and whose mental or physical fitness seems tohave been gravely diminished.(3) Wounded and sick who have recovered, but whose mental or physical fitness seems tohave been gravely and permanently diminished.185To the extent that any of the detainees at present or in the future reach such stages of mentalor physical fitness, the obligation of humane treatment imposed upon the United States requirestermination of their captivity.VI. ConclusionThe dominant paradigms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which concern either inter-stateor internal armed conflict, do not sit well with the new face of armed conflict presented by Al Qaeda.The non-state actor who engages in heinous conduct has been an outcast to the laws of war, whetherone looks at the terrorism of William Quantrill in the 1860's or the terrorism of Al Qaeda today. Forthat reason, it is understandable that the full protections envisaged by those conventions were notapplied in the types of conflicts that emerged after 9/11. Nevertheless, influenced by developmentsin the fields of human rights and international criminal law, the laws of war have now evolved to apoint where the “public dictates of conscience” compel the application of core protections even forthe outcast. Those protections are reflected in both conventional and customary international law,and may be seen in common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Article 75 of theirAdditional Protocol I. If the United States wishes to act in accordance with international law, such
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standards should guide the United States in the conditions of the detention and the mechanisms bywhich detainees are prosecuted for crimes.Moreover, those standards should guide the United States in its decision-making on therelease of detainees. Detainees in the “war on terror” may not be held until the “cessation ofhostilities.” They may only be held so long as the particular detainee at issue represents a danger orthreat to the detaining power. The detaining power is obligated to undertake periodic reviews, by anappropriate court or administrative board, of whether that threat continues to exist. Once the detaineeis determined not to be a threat, or their mental or physical fitness has been gravely diminished, thedetainee must be released immediately. If the detainee will likely be exposed to abuse by being sentback to his country of origin, he may not be returned. In that case, or in the case of a detainee whosecountry of origin will not accept his return or recognize his nationality, the United States is obligatedto release the detainee in the United States until an appropriate alternative place for relocation canbe resolved. Continued detention of persons deemed not to be a threat is unlawful andunconscionable.
